Which norms are rarely enforced and may be violated without serious consequences?

PLoS One. 2021; 16(7): e0254574.

Florian Wanders, Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Resources, Visualization, Writing – original draft,1 Astrid C. Homan, Conceptualization, Methodology, Supervision, Writing – review & editing,1 Annelies E. M. van Vianen, Conceptualization, Project administration, Supervision, Writing – review & editing,1,* Rima-Maria Rahal, Conceptualization, Methodology, Resources, Writing – review & editing,2 and Gerben A. van Kleef, Conceptualization, Methodology, Supervision, Writing – review & editing3

Camelia Delcea, Editor

Abstract

Norm violators demonstrate that they can behave as they wish, which makes them appear powerful. Potentially, this is the beginning of a self-reinforcing loop, in which greater perceived power invites further norm violations. Here we investigate the possibility that sanctions can break this loop by reducing the power that observers attribute to norm violators. Despite an abundance of research on the effects of sanctions as deterrents for norm-violating behavior, little is known about how sanctions may change perceptions of individuals who do (or do not) violate norms. Replicating previous research, we found in two studies (N1 = 203, N2 = 132) that norm violators are perceived as having greater volitional capacity compared to norm abiders. Qualifying previous research, however, we demonstrate that perceptions of volition only translate into attributions of greater power in the absence of sanctions. We discuss implications for social hierarchies and point out avenues for further research on the social dynamics of power.

Introduction

Social norms—implicit or explicit rules or principles that are understood by members of a group and that guide and/or constrain behavior [1]–create a shared understanding of what is acceptable within a given context and thereby contribute to the functioning of social collectives [2–4]. Accordingly, research has documented that people who violate norms tend to elicit negative responses in others, including unfavorable social perceptions [5], negative emotions [6–8], scolding [9], gossip [10], and punishment [11–13]. Intriguingly, however, research has also demonstrated that norm violators are perceived as powerful [5], high in status [14], and influential [15]. This possibly opens the door to a “self-reinforcing loop” (p. 351 [16]): Norm violators appear powerful and bystanders may submit to powerful others [17], thereby inviting further norm violations and consolidating norm violators’ power [5]. The question then arises: How can we prevent people from gaining unjustified influence through norm violations? Here we investigate whether sanctions reduce the extent to which norm violators appear powerful, thereby breaking the self-reinforcing loop to power that norm violations can set off.

Norm violations signal power

We define norm violations as any behavior that infringes on a norm [5], whether informal (i.e., learned by observing others) or formal (i.e., written). Norm violations are ubiquitous, from talking at the movies to using public transport without a ticket. These behaviors violate social norms that are both endorsed and enacted by most members of a group (injunctive and descriptive norms, respectively) [4]. Injunctive and descriptive norms are individually perceived but when people are cognizant of prevailing norms and endorse these norms, both types of norms can converge and be shared at the collective level [18]. By ignoring the norms that bind others, norm violators demonstrate that they can act as they wish and do not fear interference from others [5]. This is a freedom that typically comes with higher rank [19].

The influential approach/inhibition theory of power [20] states that power, which is commonly defined as asymmetrical control over valuable resources that enables influence, liberates behavior, whereas powerlessness constrains it. Indeed, ample research supports that power renders people more likely to act, even if the resulting behavior is inappropriate or harmful [21, 22]. Because behavioral freedom is thus intimately associated with power, people who observe unchecked behavior of others may make inferences about others’ level of power. Indeed, people who act as they wish and disregard social norms are perceived as having high status [14], influence [15], and power [5]. Furthermore, these perceptions can, under particular circumstances, fuel actual granting of power, for instance via the conferral of control over outcomes, voting, and leadership endorsement [23, 24].

In line with the notion that power liberates behavior, previous research has demonstrated that norm violators are perceived as powerful because they appear to experience the freedom to act as they please [5, 14, 15]–that is, they are high on volitional capacity. In other words, norm violators are perceived as powerful because their behavior signals an underlying quality, namely the freedom to act at will. This argument resonates with costly signaling theory [25, 26], which states that any seemingly costly behavior (involving large investments or risks of receiving negative outcomes) functions as a signal of an underlying characteristic [25, 26]. An example of costly behavior is the reckless driving of young men as to show their strength and skills to peers and potential mates, risking serious injury or death—a type of behavior that is under particular circumstances “rewarded” with power [27]. Norm violations are potentially costly as they are frequently sanctioned [14] by means of formal (e.g., legal) punishment [28] and/or informal (social) punishment (e.g., anger, social exclusion [29, 30]). According to costly signaling theory, people who engage in potentially costly norm-violating behavior signal that they possess traits that allow them not to worry about interferences from others. Because this capacity to do what one wants is typically reserved for the powerful [31], norm violators appear powerful when there are no additional cues that provide direct information about this attribute [5].

Sanctions curb norm violators’ perceived power

If norm violations signal power, this opens the door to a self-reinforcing loop [5, 16]. Norm violators’ claim to power is likely to be granted because people tend to submit to powerful others [17, 24, 32]. For example, people who interrupt others during meetings may be granted influence by receiving more time to speak [14, 33]. As a consequence, their contributions may be noted more readily, which increases their chances for influence and promotion [34]. Norm violators may therefore climb up in social hierarchies. The question then arises: Can people be prevented from gaining power through norm violations?

Here we adopt a social-perceptual lens and investigate whether sanctions reduce the extent to which norm violators appear powerful. Specifically, we propose that sanctions reduce the signal of power that norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity sends. Bystanders easily infer that norm violators are free to act according to their own volition [5]. In the absence of additional information, this inference of volitional capacity functions as a signal of power [5, 16]. However, we argue that if bystanders receive information that norm violators are sanctioned, they no longer need to rely on such signals. That is, they may directly conclude that norm violators who are reprimanded for their behavior do not have the power they seemed to have but are bound by the same norms that bind others around them. To summarize, we argue that bystanders perceive norm violators as powerful because they infer that norm violators have the capacity to act according to their own volition (replication of Van Kleef et al [5]). However, we propose that sanctions reduce the extent to which observers perceive norm violators as powerful by severing the link between volition and power perceptions (see Fig 1).

Conceptual model of the proposed moderating effect of sanctioning.

Overview

The goal of the current manuscript was to investigate whether sanctions reduce the extent to which norm violators are seen as powerful. In our experimental design we focus on the violation of a legal norm that most people in society tend to endorse and enact, and sanctions refer to formal rather than informal sanctions. We present the results of two studies which replicate the finding that unsanctioned norm violators appear powerful [5], and support the current hypothesis that sanctions curb the effect of norm violations on power perceptions. The investigation of the exact mechanism underlying this effect was in part exploratory, and we denote where this was the case when presenting our results.

Study 1

Methods

Participants and design

Study 1 employed a 2 (norm violation: abide vs. violate) × 2 (sanctioning: no sanction vs. sanction) between-subjects design, and participants could win one of four 15€ vouchers. This study was part of a student project using a cell size of about 50 participants and including an additional exploratory condition (n = 121) which we do not report here (see S1 File for further information). Ethics approval was obtained from the ethical review board, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands (ref.: 2014-WOP-3498). The code of conduct of the German Society for Psychology does not require special permits for international researchers and, for ethical considerations in research, the same codified ethical guidelines apply in Germany as in the Netherlands. All participants provided written informed consent prior to their participation (online, by clicking “yes”).

We recruited 236 participants at a German university campus and through social media, of which 203 were retained for analyses (153 women, 50 men, Mage = 23.78, range = 18–59). Seventeen participants were removed because they did not complete the questionnaire, and 16 participants were excluded because they failed attention checks. These exclusion criteria were decided a-priori. A sensitivity analysis conducted in G-power suggested that when testing a moderated mediation model involving 5 predictors (norm violation, volition, sanctioning, norm violation x sanctioning, volition x sanctioning) and α = 0.05 the analysis would have a power of 0.80 to detect a small to medium effect (ƒ2 = 0.06). In addition, we calculated ν-statistics [35] for the central tests of our moderated mediation model. The ν-statistic for the regressions of volition on norm violation was ν = 0.897. The ν-statistic for the regression of power on volition, norm violation, sanctioning, and the two-way interactions between violation and sanctioning as well as volition and sanctioning was ν = 1.000. These statistics show that this study was sufficiently powered.

Manipulation

Participants read about a traveler who either purchased a ticket before boarding a train (norm abider) or purchased a snack instead and did not purchase a ticket (norm violator). The norm abider could not find the ticket when approached by a controller on the train but told the controller that he did buy one. Likewise, the norm violator told the controller that he did buy a ticket but said that he had already been checked. The controller then either did not insist on seeing the ticket (no sanction) or did insist and fined the traveler who was unable to show the ticket (sanction; see the S1 File for the full scenarios). Assignment to conditions was random.

Measures

After reading about the traveler, participants indicated to what extent they thought the traveler acted out of his own volition, and to what extent they perceived the traveler as powerful. The measures including all items can be found in the supplementary material. Participants answered a set of additional questions (administered as part of a thesis project) before completing manipulation and attention checks.

Volition perceptions. Perceptions of volition (α = .88) were measured with six items [1]. An example item is: “To what extent does this person feel free to do what s/he wants?” with scales ranging from 1 = not very much, to 7 = very much.

Power perceptions. Perceptions of power (α = .88) were measured with a validated 8-item sense of power scale [36]. Example items are: “I think this person has a great deal of power” and “I think this person’s wishes do not carry much weight (reverse scored)” with scale anchors ranging from 1 = strongly disagree, to 7 = strongly agree.

Manipulation checks. Two questions each assessed in how far participants thought the traveler violated norms (“To what extent did the traveler violate norms?”; “To what extent did the traveler abide by norms?” [reverse-scored]; r = .87) and in how far participants thought the traveler was sanctioned (“To what extent was the traveler sanctioned?”; “To what extent did the traveler get away unsanctioned?” [reverse-scored]; r = .93). Scale anchors for both manipulation checks were 1 = not at all, and 7 = extremely.

Attention checks. Participants answered two questions each asking whether traveling without a ticket was allowed/prohibited, whether the traveler did/did not buy a ticket, whether the traveler was/was not fined, and whether the traveler was/was not honest. Answer options were yes versus no, and participants who provided incorrect responses were excluded from the analyses.

Results

Manipulation checks

To test whether the manipulations of norm violation and sanctioning were successful, we ran two separate ANOVAs with norm violation and sanctioning as between-subjects factors. First, the ANOVA with the norm violation manipulation check as dependent variable revealed the expected main effect of norm violation, F(1,199) = 1085.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .845. Norm violators (M = 6.29, SD = 0.78, 95% CI [6.136, 6.442]) were seen as violating norms to a considerably greater extent than norm abiders (M = 2.14, SD = 1.13, 95% CI [1.916, 2.361]). Unexpectedly, there was also a main effect of sanctioning, F(1,199) = 18.41, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.085, and a significant interaction effect, F(1,199) = 18.52, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.085. Further probing using simple slopes analysis revealed no significant effect of sanctioning for norm violators, t(199) = 0.01, p = .993, 95% CI [-0.348, 0.351], d = 0.002, but there was a significant effect for norm abiders, t(199) = 6.06, p < .001, 95% CI [0.728, 1.429], d = 1.207: Non-sanctioned norm abiders were perceived as violating norms to a greater extent than sanctioned norm abiders. Given that the effect sizes of the unexpected effects (both ηp2 = 0.085) were ten times smaller than that of the intended effect (ηp2 = .845) we consider this manipulation successful.

Second, the ANOVA with the sanctioning manipulation check as dependent variable revealed only the expected main effect of sanctioning, F(1,199) = 1589.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .889. Sanctioned travelers (M = 5.94, SD = 1.06, 95% CI [5.733, 6.149]) were seen as considerably more sanctioned than non-sanctioned travelers (M = 1.29, SD = 0.51, 95% CI [1.186, 1.388]). Neither the effect of norm violation nor the interaction between sanctioning and norm violation were significant (F < 2.85, p >.093). Thus, the manipulation was successful.

Replication of the norm violation-perceived power link

Next, we aimed to replicate Van Kleef et al.’s [5] norm violation → volition → perceived power links in the absence of sanctions, before investigating how these links are affected by the presence of sanctions. As illustrated in the left-hand panel of Fig 2, a planned contrast revealed that in the absence of sanctions norm violators appeared more powerful than norm abiders, t(99) = 2.02, p = .047, 95% CI [0.005, 0.690], d = 0.401 (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).

Means and standard errors for the effects of norm abidance vs. violation on perceptions of volition and power in Study 1 in the absence (left panel) vs. presence (right panel) of sanctions.

Table 1

Means and standard deviations for the effects of norm abidance vs. violation on perceptions of volition and power in Study 1 in the absence vs. presence of sanctions.

For testing our directional prediction that volition mediates the link between norm violation and perceived power, we used one-tailed tests [37]. Norm violators were seen as acting more according to their own volition compared to norm abiders, B = 1.65, SE = 0.19, t(99) = 8.76, p < .001, 95% CI [1.276, 2.023], and greater perceived volitional capacity was, in turn, related to greater perceived power, B = 0.18, SE = 0.09, t(98) = 1.99, p = .025, 95% CI [0.029, Inf]. Bootstrapped confidence intervals indicate that the indirect effect of norm violation on perceived power via volition was significant, Bindirect = 0.30, SE = 0.15, 95% CI [0.010, 0.582], υ = 0.029. The effect size υ indicates a sufficient although small indirect effect [38]. We therefore consider the replication of the norm violation → volition → perceived power links successful.

The role of sanctioning

Concerning the effect of sanctioning on the norm violation → volition → perceived power link, we predicted that sanctioning would reduce the extent to which norm violators appear powerful. Furthermore, we proposed that sanctioning would reduce the signal of power that norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity sends. We tested this idea in three steps. First, we tested whether sanctioning reduced the extent to which norm violators were seen as powerful. A planned contrast suggests that sanctioned norm violators were indeed perceived as less powerful than non-sanctioned norm violators t(100) = -10.68, p < .001, 95% CI [-2.114, -1.452], d = -2.115 (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).

Next, we explored where in the norm violation → volition → perceived power links sanctions exerted their moderating impact. Our theoretical argument suggested that observers perceive norm violators as having greater volitional capacity than norm abiders regardless of whether they are sanctioned, whereas they will perceive norm violators as powerful only if they are not sanctioned. In line with this idea, a mixed-model ANOVA among norm violators with sanctioning (no sanction vs. sanction) as between-subjects factor and scale (volition vs. power) as within-subjects factor revealed—besides significant main effects of sanctioning, F(1,100) = 51.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .339 and scale F(1,100) = 122.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .551—a significant interaction between both, F(1,100) = 47.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .323. As Fig 3 shows, whereas sanctions did not significantly affect the extent to which norm violators appeared to act according to their own volition, t(100) = -1.50, p = .136, 95% CI [-0.675, 0.093], d = -0.298, they significantly reduced perceptions of power t(100) = -10.68, p < .001, 95% CI [-2.114, -1.452], d = -2.115. This suggests that sanctions reduce the signal of power that norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity sends.

Effects of sanctions on perceptions of norm violators in Study 1.

Error bars are standard errors around the mean.

In a final step, we tested whether sanctioning moderated the effect of volition on perceived power in the norm violation → volition → perceived power link. Sanctioning moderated the effect of volition on perceived power in the mediation chain when the confidence interval for the product a × b2 of the effect of norm violation on volition (a in Fig 4, left panel) and the interaction of volition and sanction on power perception (b2) excludes zero [39]. See the supplement for a detailed explanation.

Statistical model (left) of the proposed moderating effect of sanctioning in Study 1.

Black arrows in the statistical model highlight relevant effects for moderated mediation (ab2). Simple slopes with standard errors (right) illustrate b2, the lack of an interaction of volition and sanctions on power perceptions.

Contrary to our expectations, this was not the case, B = 0.10, SE = 0.2, 95% CI [-0.294, 0.520]. Whereas the effect of norm violation on volition (a) was significant, B = 1.85, SE = 0.15, t(201) = 12.40, p < .001, 95% CI [1.553, 2.141], the interaction between volition and sanctioning on power (b2) was not, B = 0.05, SE = 0.12, t(197) = 0.45, p = .651, 95% CI [-0.181, 0.289], rendering the product a × b2 nonsignificant. We therefore cannot conclude that sanctioning reduced the extent to which norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity translated into power perceptions. Fig 4 (right panel) illustrates this absence of an interaction between sanctions and volition (slopes are similar across conditions) and shows that sanctioning directly reduced perceptions of power.

Discussion

Study 1 replicated the finding that norm violators are seen as acting more according to their own volition than norm abiders, and that greater volition in turn related to greater inferences of power [5]. As expected, sanctioning reduced the extent to which norm violators were seen as powerful. However, sanctioning did not significantly affect the extent to which norm violators appeared to act according to their own volition. Although this is consistent with our theoretical model, which proposes that sanctioning targets the power-signaling effect of volition in the norm violation → volition → perceived power mediation chain, we found no full support for this pattern. Instead, sanctioning directly reduced perceptions of power irrespective of volition. One explanation for why sanctioning did not moderate the power-signaling effect of volition could be that volition was not strongly linked to power perceptions in this study in the first place. Therefore, we aimed to replicate the norm violation → volition → perceived power chain in a second study which also allowed us to improve the ecological validity of our design.

Study 2

The 2(violate vs. abide) × 2(no sanction vs. sanction) design of Study 1 allowed us to test our predictions in a single moderated mediation model. Yet, despite its elegance, this design necessitated a compromise: To enable orthogonal manipulations of norm violation and sanctioning, neither the norm violator (who never purchased a ticket) nor the norm abider (who lost it) showed a valid ticket, which is sanctionable behavior. Although this enabled a full-factorial design allowing different comparisons between conditions, including a condition with sanctions for a norm abider who lost the ticket, may have undermined the credibility of the scenario, and renders interpretation of the results less straightforward. First, norm violators might have appeared more powerful than norm abiders not because norm violators demonstrated volitional capacity, but because norm abiders seemed incapable. Second, one might question whether norm abiders who lost their ticket really abided by norms, as, according to German train regulations, travelers must at all times be able to show a valid ticket. Therefore, in Study 2, we let the norm abider buy and show a ticket to the controller, moving from the 2×2 design of Study 1 to a 3-cell design.

Methods

Participants and design

Study 2 employed a 3-cell (norm abider vs. norm violator vs. sanctioned norm violator) between-subjects design and relied on a sample of Dutch participants that was collected as part of a larger project. Participants could win one of five 10€ vouchers. Ethics approval was obtained from the ethical review board, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam (ref.: 2017-COP-8050). All participants provided written informed consent prior to their participation (online, by clicking “yes”).

To ensure comparable cell sizes as in Study 1, we recruited 159 participants at the university, of which 132 were retained for analyses (83 women, 49 men, Mage = 25.80, range = 18–66). Seven participants were removed because they did not complete the questionnaire, and an additional 20 participants were excluded because they failed attention checks. These exclusion criteria were decided a-priori. A sensitivity analysis conducted in G-power suggested that with 5 predictors (experimental condition 1 [non-sanctioned norm violators vs. abiders], experimental condition 2 [non-sanctioned norm violators vs. sanctioned norm violators], volition, violation x condition 1, volition x condition 2) and α = 0.05 the analysis would have a power of 0.80 to detect a small to medium effect (ƒ2 = 0.10). In addition, we calculated ν-statistics [35] to establish sufficient power. The central test in Study 2 constituted the regression of power on the interaction between volition and experimental condition, which resulted in a ν-statistic of ν = .999 (regressing of volition on experimental condition resulted in a ν-statistic of 0.955). This indicates that our study was sufficiently powered.

Manipulation

As in Study 1, participants read about a traveler who either purchased a ticket before boarding a train (norm abider) or purchased a snack instead (and no ticket). When approached by a controller, the norm abider showed the ticket. The norm violator told the controller that he did buy a ticket but said that he had already been checked. The controller then either did not insist on seeing the ticket (norm violator) or did insist and fined the traveler who was unable to show the ticket (sanctioned norm violator; see the S1 File for the full scenarios). Assignment to conditions was random.

Measures

After reading about the traveler, participants completed the same measures of perceived power (α = .87) and volition (α = .85) as in Study 1. Besides completing manipulation and attention checks (see below), participants answered a set of additional questions as part of a student project, which were not analyzed (see the S1 File).

Manipulation checks. Three questions assessed in how far participants thought the norm violator violated norms: “He behaved in line with norms”, “He violated norms”, and “He behaved appropriately” (reverse coded, α = .92; adapted from Stamkou et al [23]). Three further questions assessed in how far participants thought the traveler was sanctioned: “The traveler was punished”, “The traveler had to pay for his behavior”, and “The traveler was fined” (α = .96). Scale anchors for all scales in this study ranged from 1 = completely disagree, to 7 = completely agree.

Attention check. Participants were asked whether the traveler bought a ticket and whether the controller fined the traveler. Answer options were yes versus no, and participants who provided incorrect responses were excluded from the analyses.

Results

Separate ANOVAs on the manipulation checks with experimental condition as between subjects variable revealed significant differences between conditions on both the norm violation manipulation check, F(2,129) = 161.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .715, and the sanctioning manipulation check, F(2,129) = 179.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .735. Participants perceived both the sanctioned (M = 5.89, SD = 0.87, 95% CI [5.630, 6.143]) and the non-sanctioned norm violator (M = 5.91, SD = 1.03, 95% CI [5.585, 6.237]) to have violated norms to a greater extent than the norm abider (M = 2.41, SD = 1.23, 95% CI [2.036, 2.782]). Participants also perceived the sanctioned norm violator (M = 5.95, SD = 0.85, 95% CI [5.702, 6.199]) as having been sanctioned to a greater extent than either the non-sanctioned norm violator (M = 2.28, SD = 1.13, 95% CI [1.927, 2.643]), or the norm abider (M = 2.20, SD = 1.24, 95% CI [1.821, 2.573]). This shows that the manipulations were successful.

As in Study 1, we aimed to replicate Van Kleef et al.’s [5] norm violation → volition → perceived power links in the absence of sanctioning, before investigating how these links are affected by sanctioning. As illustrated in Fig 5, a planned contrast revealed that, in the absence of sanctions, norm violators appeared more powerful than norm abiders, t(83) = 7.27, p < .001, 95% CI [0.697, 1.222], d = 1.579 (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations).

Means and standard errors for the effects of norm abidance (control), norm violation (no sanction), and sanctioned norm violation (sanction) on inferences of volition and power in Study 2.

Table 2

Means and standard deviations for the effects of norm abidance (control), norm violation (no sanction) and sanctioned norm violation (sanction) on inferences of volition and power in Study 2.

Concerning the mediating role of volition, norm violators were seen as acting more according to their own volition compared to norm abiders, B = 1.12, SE = 0.15, t(83) = 7.30, p < .001, 95% CI [0.816, 1.427], and greater volitional capacity was, in turn, related to greater perceived power, B = 0.29, SE = 0.09, t(82) = 3.30, p = .001, 95% CI [0.117, 0.471. Bootstrapped confidence intervals showed that the indirect effect of norm violation on perceived power via volition was significant, Bindirect = 0.33, SE = 0.12, 95% CI [0.118, 0.623], υ = 0.046. We therefore consider the replication of the norm violation → volition → perceived power chain successful and proceed to investigate how sanctions affect this chain.

We predicted that sanctioning reduces the extent to which norm violators appear powerful. Furthermore, we proposed that sanctioning reduces the signal of power that norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity sends. First, we tested whether sanctioning reduces the extent to which norm violators are seen as powerful. A planned contrast indicates that sanctioned norm violators were indeed perceived as less powerful than non-sanctioned norm violators, t(86) = -7.38, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.544, -0.889], d = -1.578 (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations).

Second, mixed-model ANOVA among norm violators with sanctioning (no sanction vs. sanction) as between-subjects factor and scale (volition vs. power) as within-subjects factor revealed—besides significant main effects of sanctioning, F(1,86) = 28.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .250 and scale F(1,86) = 64.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .428—a significant interaction between both, F(1,86) = 25.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .227. As Fig 6 shows, whereas sanctioning did not significantly reduce the extent to which norm violators appeared to act according to their own volition, t(86) = 1.18, p = .241, 95% CI [-0.136, 0.533], d = 0.252, they significantly reduced perceptions of power t(86) = 7.38, p < .001, 95% CI [0.889, 1.544], d = 1.578. As in Study 1, this is consistent with the possibility that sanctioning reduces the signal of power that norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity sends.

Effects of sanctioning on perceptions of norm violators in Study 2.

Error bars are standard errors around the mean.

In a final step, we tested whether sanctioning moderates the effect of volition on power perceptions. Unlike in Study 1, where the 2×2 design allowed us to test this prediction in a moderated mediation model, we now regressed power perceptions on the interaction between experimental condition and volition, overall Radj2 = 0.401. This analysis corresponds to testing for moderated mediation in Study 1 (specifically, to the b2 path in Fig 4). If sanctioning indeed reduces the signal of power that norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity sends, we should find an interaction between volition and the comparison of sanctioned vs. non-sanctioned norm violators, which is why we chose the latter as reference group. This regression revealed a significant effect of volition, B = 0.50, SE = 0.14, t(126) = 3.50, p = .001, 95% CI [0.218, 0.786], an interaction between volition and norm abidance (vs. non-sanctioned norm violation), B = -0.43, SE = 0.21, t(126) = -2.09, p = .039, 95% CI [-0.838, -0.022], and the expected interaction between volition and sanctioned norm violation (vs. non-sanctioned norm violation), B = -0.41, SE = 0.19, t(126) = -2.23, p = .028, 95% CI [-0.780, -0.046]. This suggests that the relationship between volition and power was different for non-sanctioned norm violators compared to both norm abiders and sanctioned norm violators. As the simple slopes in Fig 7 illustrate, for non-sanctioned norm violators, greater volition inferences translated into greater inferences of power, B = 0.50, SE = 0.14, 95% CI [0.218, 0.786], whereas this was not the case for norm abiders, B = 0.07, SE = 0.15, 95% CI [-0.222, 0.365], or sanctioned norm violators, B = 0.09, SE = 0.12, 95% CI [-0.144, 0.322]. The positive slope for non-sanctioned norm violators significantly differed from the flatter slopes of both norm abiders, t(126) = 2.09, p = .039, 95% CI [0.022, 0.838], d = 0.453, and sanctioned norm violators, t(126) = 2.23, p = .028, 95% CI [0.046, 0.780], d = 0.476, indicating that sanctions indeed attenuated the signal of power that norm violator’s apparent volition sends.

Simple slopes for the interaction of volition and sanctioning on power perceptions.

The labels in the figure correspond to the following labels in Study 1: no sanction (non-sanctioned norm violator in Study 1), sanction (sanctioned norm violator), and control (non-sanctioned norm abider).

Discussion

Study 2 replicated the finding that norm violators are seen as acting more according to their own volition, and that greater volition in turn relates to greater inferences of power [5]. As expected, sanctioning reduced the extent to which norm violators were seen as powerful, but it did not significantly affect the extent to which norm violators appeared to act according to their own volition. This suggests that sanctioning specifically targets the power-signaling effect of volition, and the interaction between experimental condition and volition further supported this prediction.

General discussion

Next to eliciting negative responses in observers, people who violate norms also demonstrate that they can behave as they wish, which makes them appear powerful [5]. This may open the door to a “self-reinforcing loop” (p. 351 [16]) in which norm violators gain power in the eyes of observers, in turn giving norm violators more leeway to keep violating norms and consolidating their ascribed power. The question then arises: How can we prevent people from gaining influence through norm violations? Here we proposed that sanctioning reduces the extent to which norm violator’s volition signals power, thereby breaking the norm violation → volition → perceived power chain. In two studies we replicated this chain [5], and in both studies sanctions reduced perceptions of power. In Study 1, in which we prioritized the use of a full-factorial design over ecological validity, sanctioning reduced power perceptions irrespective of volition. In Study 2, in which we employed a one-factor design to enable creating more realistic scenarios, we found support for the idea that sanctioning specifically targets the extent to which norm violators’ apparent volition signals power. Together, the results of both studies suggest that sanctioning can break the self-reinforcing loop to power that norm violations might set off [5, 16].

Theoretical and practical implications

The current findings have a number of implications. From a theoretical perspective, we demonstrated that sanctioning reduces power perceptions, rather than perceptions of volition. By identifying a boundary condition of the power-signaling effect of volition, we expand previous research on this link [5, 31] and enrich understanding of costly signaling [25, 26]. Our findings suggest that potentially costly behavior (e.g., a norm violation) can only act as a signal of an underlying trait (e.g., power) in the absence of additional cues that provide direct information about that trait (e.g., no sanctions). When translating costly signaling theory from animal to human behavior [25, 40], the possibility that additional information (e.g., a sanction) may drown potentially costly indirect signals (e.g., the demonstration of volitional capacity) needs to be taken into account.

From a practical perspective, our findings suggest that sanctions may be effective in breaking the self-reinforcing loop to power that norm violations may set off [5, 16]. This points to ways in which the ascent of norm violators in social hierarchies can be prevented. For example, employees can create a culture in which blatant interruptions are not tolerated by reprimanding interrupters. Should norm violations persist, more formal sanctions may be called for.

Limitations and future directions

The current study has a number of limitations. First, although in both studies sanctioning reduced power perceptions, the results are mixed concerning the underlying mechanism. Whereas in Study 1 sanctioning reduced power perceptions irrespective of volition, Study 2 yielded support for the idea that sanctioning specifically targets the extent to which norm violators’ apparent volition signals power. One explanation for this discrepancy may lie in the different control conditions we employed. In Study 1, norm abiders were—like norm violators—not able to show a valid ticket, and some norm abiders were also sanctioned. Although this design is adequate to test predictions in a full-factorial model allowing different comparisons between conditions, it also made interpretation of the results difficult. We solved this dilemma by running a second study that was more realistic and unequivocal as norm abiders now bought and showed a valid ticket to the controller. Future replication efforts should therefore focus on Study 2 to gain further confidence in the robustness of our findings. Also, although previous research [5, 14] confirmed the mediating role of volition in the link between norm violation and perceived power, future research could experimentally manipulate volition as to substantiate a causal relation between volition and perceived power.

A second limitation is our reliance on scenarios. This approach affords experimental control and allowed us to make clear to our participants whether or not norms were violated (by informing participants whether a ticket was bought). Although previous research [5, 8, 23, 24] has shown that results obtained in scenario studies were very consistent with results obtained in more realistic settings, future studies could investigate and extend the current findings using more ecologically valid procedures. In addition, strong evidence for the effect of norm violation on power perceptions would be if bystanders would submit to the supposed power of norm violators, for example, by following their instructions. Future research could focus on measuring the behaviors of bystanders reflecting their submission to norm violators’ power.

A further complication and next step for future research is that real-life interactions may not terminate after a sanction, but instead the norm violator may object to, or even retaliate against, the punisher. Indeed, previous research already pointed out that enacting sanctions may only be possible for dominant individuals [41], and characteristics of the punisher therefore also need to be taken into account. Also, future studies could investigate observer responses in situations where the norm violator is a member of an ingroup or outgroup or where norm violators continue their behavior after being sanctioned.

Third, we considered the norm violation in this study as a violation of a descriptive and injunctive legal norm. We assumed that buying a train ticket is a well-known legal norm enacted and endorsed as appropriate by most study participants. Although we did not test this assumption, the results of the manipulation checks in both studies showed that participants perceived the behavior of the norm violator to be violating of norms. Train passengers who do not buy a train ticket transgress a legal norm and run the risk of being formally penalized by means of a fine. Note that laws, as opposed to social norms, are not negotiated through social interaction, which means that people’s responses to violating the legal norm to buy a train ticket may be relatively similar across social contexts [42]. Prior research has shown that legal norm violations such as financial fraud [5] or illegal parking [23] elicit similar responses from observers as non-legal norm violations such as arriving late to a meeting [8] or putting one’s feet on another’s table [5]. The recurring pattern across these and various other behaviors is that norm violators are perceived by others as powerful. Future research on norm violation could pay more attention to the actual endorsement and enactment of specific norms among study participants. Additionally, future research could examine situations where the violation of an injunctive norm does not constitute a violation of a descriptive norm and vice versa [43, 44] to understand how participants differentially respond to violations of such more complicated normative influences.

In addition, not all norm violations are created equal [4]. Free-riding on the train is costly to society, and therefore sanctioning may be in order. However, some norms are outright harmful [45]. Going against such harmful norms may underline norm violators’ apparent conviction of what is right and wrong. When norms are violated for deontological reasons, sanctioning might not reduce inferences of power. On the contrary, sanctions might elevate norm violators to the status of a martyr as they suffer for a cause [46], thereby allowing them to amass even more influence.

Finally, our studies comprised a majority of female participants from different countries (Germany and the Netherlands). Although this gender composition is not representative for the population, we do not assume gender differences in individual responses to the violation of a legal norm such as buying a train ticket. Moreover, participants were randomly assigned to conditions and our findings corroborate those of previous research. We found that the German participants in Study 1 perceived non-sanctioned norm abiders to have violated norms to a greater extent than sanctioned norm abiders. This unexpected finding might stem from a culturally defined norm that a monetary fine should always be imposed when travelers cannot show a ticket. Indeed, cultures vary in norm strength and tolerance of deviant behavior [47] and may therefore differ in responses to (missing) sanctions. Also, the current studies were conducted in individualistic (as opposed to collectivistic) cultures where there is a positive link between norm violation and power perceptions [8]. Therefore, future research could address possible cultural differences in responses to the sanctioning of norm violations [48].

Conclusion

Our results indicate that sanctioning can prevent norm violators from gaining power in the eyes of observers. Sanctions may therefore be effective in breaking the self-reinforcing loop to power that norm violations can set off [5, 16].

Supporting information

S1 File

Supplemental material.

(PDF)

Funding Statement

The author(s) received no specific funding for this work.

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Decision Letter 0

18 Feb 2021

PONE-D-20-25007

How norm violators rise and fall in the eyes of others: The role of sanctions

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Reviewer #1: The paper tackles an interesting and important topic, it is well written and all analyses are described clearly, including limitations and indicating which aspects where exploratory or previously hypothesized.

I thus have only a few minor comments:

- the authors remain a bit silent about which online participant pools they use. Is this something comparable to MTurk, or are these student participants?

- Some of the arguments for the difference in effects between the first study and previous studies are based on arguments about the German Railway norms, however, the second study then is (again, as previous studies, I guess) done in the Netherlands. It would be interesting to understand whether this - as opposed to the design differences - plays a role for the effects, whether norms and norm abidance are perceived differently in the two systems.

- the authors themselves discuss that one problem with the results is the hypothetical character. There are by now several studies from the team of Marie-Claire Villeval (Lyon) which use real settings to study similar questions. I am wondering whether the authors are aware of this research and whether they might consider doing more real world studies in the future.

- in their motivational examples, the authors always use firm contexts (interrupting colleagues etc.) - why do they then choose railway examples for the study?

- my main issue is actually with the signaling idea. If norm violation signals power through being a potentially costly volitional behavior, sanctioning should not necessarily reduce perceived power. The study actually cannot scrutinize this link, as it is a one-shot behavior that is being described. If there were no sanctions, it wouldn´t be costly signaling. Thus, the described mechanism could only work if norm violators keep violating even though there is a chance of being sanctioned - which implies, that in some cases they will be fined, in others not. The design is as it is, but I would like to see a more thorough discussion of this.

Reviewer #2: The study deals with an interesting and important topic related to social norms. The methods sound appropriate to test the hypotheses.

I now focus on issues that would help to improve this manuscript:

- One major issue with this paper is the need to explicate social norms. The literature has been well-documented with norms being conceptualized as injunctive norms and descriptive norms. The association between norms and social sanction has been extensively discussed in the work of Cialdini et al. (1990), Fishbein and Ajzen (2011), and Lapinski and Rimal (2005). Injunctive norms refer to what ought to be done while descriptive norms pertaining to the prevalence of a behavior. Thus, this study seems to intend to deal with injunctive norms rather than descriptive norms. Further, social norms and law are distinct concept (see Rimal & Lapinski, 2015). This study does not seem to distinguish law violation from norm violation. I would think this paper focuses on law and legal sanction, rather a norm-based approach.

- Similarly, the explication of the power concept is limited. Authors define power as the perceived potential to influence others, which is not real power (individuals might not actually hold that power, but only are perceived by others). The lack of explication makes the conceptualization and operationalization of this variable sound less convincing. When we read/see a person not buying a bus ticket, there is little ground to argue that others would think the violator has a great deal of power. The authors use an example of people violating the talking norms in meetings to illustrate their point, but these two contexts are fundamentally different: Some people can talk freely in meetings because they either have real power or the behavior could actually be part of the organizational norms (the meeting norm is that you can interrupt others' talk if you do have something important to say). I would not think a traveler who did not conform to the law as having "a great deal of power," not mentioning that they told lies to authorities. I would think that someone escaping a law sanction as a lucky individual and that should be inferred as the person having power, unless he/she has further actions (ex: making a phone call to powerful others, which is a form of reference power). Such definition and operationalization as written in the paper, therefore, do not sound convincing to me.

- I see that it is quite controversial to argue that freedom to do something would always lead to inferences of power possession. It might only signal power as the authors suggest under some certain conditions (there should be boundary conditions). I would think that people can think of someone who acts as she/he wants, which deviates from social approval, as having less power. This rival theory can be illustrated, for example, by historical accounts related to social movements in which less powerful individuals in a society (both real and perceived) violate a political norm/law to gain power. We may also see drivers overspeed and think of them as traffic violators who would likely confront more powerful others (policemen). This social comparison will likely lead to perceptions of the violators as being less powerful, or even having no power and thus defying law to satisfy their desired power. In the same vein, a person did not buy a ticket might mean he/she has no other choice (lack of freedom) and thus violates the law (no power). This line of reasoning shows that the theorization of the model in this paper seems problematic because the authors left too many rival theories unaddressed.

- When theorization is not sound, having supporting data does not help much. The three key variables likely often have some sorts of correlations. A statistical model can be statistically significant without any theoretical background. Plus, the idea that someone has power could have more freedom to do things, even violating a law is not new in the literature. Also, the idea of sanctioning someone reducing his/her power offers no novel theoretical implication (someone goes to jail of course will normally have much less power than before). I do not see how such theorizations add to the literature.

That says, I commend the authors on engaging in a project with a rigorously methodological design. I sincerely appreciate the author(s)’ work, and I wish them the best of luck with this project.

Reviewer #3: This manuscript reports two experiments designed to test the hypothesis that norm violators will appear less powerful when they are punished than when they are not. The experiments build on earlier research showing that norm violators are perceived as more powerful than norm abiders; they introduce sanctions as a moderator of this effect.

The manuscript has a number of strengths: The research is methodologically sound; the analyses are appropriate; the write-up is clear and complete. At the same time, the research makes a very modest contribution to the literature, even more modest than the write-up suggests. It mainly shows that an effect previously demonstrated by these investigators has limited scope. It is good to know that, of course, but it does not represent the level of contribution typically found in PLOS ONE articles.

Let me describe briefly how I would interpret the results of this research, as my interpretation is somewhat different from how the authors frame the results. These results demonstrate that in a situation in which there are rules for how to behave, people are sensitive to where the power lies: with the rules or with the individuals. (I’m using rules here, rather than norms, because the research scenario conflates the two, but the same analysis holds for norms.) To the extent that people follow the rules and violations of the rules are enforced, power lies with the rules; to the extent that people violate the rules and get away with it, power lies with the individuals. Volition, on the other hand, depends on whether people try to follow the rules. Study 1 shows that neither rule-abiders nor rule-violators have much power if the rules are enforced, but if the rules are not enforced, even people who accidentally violate them (by not having their ticket to present to the conductor) have power. Study 2 shows that rules are powerful when people abide by them and when they are enforced; the relationship between individual volition and power is strongest when rules are weak. This summary captures all of the findings of this research and is entirely consistent with current views of how social rules and norms work. They clarify that the earlier finding of greater power attributed to norm violators holds only when norms are weak, but that simply serves to limit the scope and importance of the earlier finding. It does not challenge or extend current understandings of the way norms work.

I will leave to the editor the decision of whether this manuscript makes enough of a contribution to warrant publication in PLOS ONE. Regardless of where it is published, I think some revision is in order to simplify and clarify the presentation and interpretation of the results.

Reviewer #4: Referee report: PONE-D-20-25007

Summary of the paper

The authors (1) replicate previous research that third-party observers believe that norm violators have a greater volition and power than norm abiders, and (2) extend that research to understand whether sanctions can be used to reduce perceptions of power associated with norm violation. The authors conduct two studies: (1) with a German online sample and a 2X2 design (Abiding norm, violating norm)X(Sanctions, No Sanctions) and (2) with a Dutch online sample with 1X3 design (Abiding Norm), (Violating Norm X Sanctions), (Violating Norm X No Sanctions).

The authors use a vignette about a passenger buying or not buying a ticket on a train, and a controller either sanctioning (or not) the passenger who fails to show a ticket. They measure survey respondents’ perceptions of the passenger’s volition and power using survey questions. The authors claim that the main mechanism of how norm violation affects power is through volition i.e., a passenger who violates a norm is considered to act on their own volition, and this belief about volition leads to increased perceptions about the power they possess. The authors find that sanctions reduce the perceptions of power of the passenger irrespective of whether they are norm abiding or not, and irrespective of their volition (Result of Study 1). They find weak evidence for the mechanism that norm violation affects power through volition.

The paper is well-written, and the data collection and analysis are well-done.

Major critique

1. The paper clearly shows that introduction of sanctions reduces power associated with both norm-abiding and norm-violating individuals. However, the mechanism that norm violation leads to increased volition that further leads to increased power is not supported by evidence. The authors cannot claim that the mechanism is true unless they vary volition exogenously and find that perceptions of power are affected by that variation.

2. The results from Study 1 suggest that introduction of sanctions reduce perceptions of passenger’s power irrespective of his/her volition and his/her norm abidance/violation. In study 2, the authors find a different result because that they do not have a treatment with sanctions for norm-abiding behavior in this Study and thus do not have much variation in volition. I don’t think we can conclude from Study 2 that the claimed mechanism (Norm Violation-->Increased volition-->Increased power) is true.

3. Moreover, volition and power are correlated. However, there is no evidence that it is higher volition that leads to greater power. It could be the other way round where higher power leads to having greater volition.

4. It is not clear what “power” means in the context of a passenger who either buys or does not buy a ticket on a train. How does not buying a ticket make one more influential? A better way to measure power in this situation would be to see if the third-party observer is more likely to follow instructions from someone who violated the norm versus who obeyed the norm.

5. The payment to participants is small and probabilistic. For example, the participants had a 20% chance of winning a 10Euro voucher in Study 2. It is unclear how seriously the participants took the survey with these small incentives.

6. The authors use a vignette about the norm of buying a ticket or not on a train. The authors may want to discuss how this specific situation can be generalized to other situations.

Minor critique

1. When you say norms, can you clarify if they are descriptive or prescriptive norms?

2. Both the sanction and no sanction conditions in the paper technically have sanctions, in one case they are enforced and in another they are not. The authors can clarify that by changing their terminology.

3. 75% of the sample is women and is not representative of the German population in Study 1. The authors may want to discuss how the gender composition of their sample may affect the result.

4. Since Study 1 and 2 are conducted with different populations (German vs Dutch online samples), the others should comment on how comparable these studies are. Are there differences in norms of ticket buying in these two populations?

**********

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Reviewer #4: No

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Author response to Decision Letter 0

28 Mar 2021

Responses to Editor comments

1. Please ensure that your manuscript meets PLOS ONE's style requirements, including those for file naming.

Response: We have carefully checked that our manuscript meets PLOS ONE's style requirements.

2. During our internal checks, the in-house editorial staff noted that you conducted research or obtained samples in another country (for study 1). Please check the relevant national regulations and laws applying to foreign researchers and state whether you obtained the required permits and approvals. Please address this in your ethics statement in both the manuscript and submission information.

Response: The study was approved by the Ethical review board of the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the University of Amsterdam, but data was collected online from a convenience sample of participants in Germany. The Code of Conduct of the German Psychological Society stipulates ethical considerations (https://www.dgps.de/index.php?id=85) for research with human participants, which do not reference special permits required for international researchers. Further, ethical considerations in research in Germany are subject to the same codified ethical guidelines as in the Netherlands, namely the Helsinki Declaration and European data protection regulations. Therefore, no additional permits were required to conduct this research. We have added this information in the ethics statement in both the manuscript (Methods section Study 1) and submission.

3. Thank you for your ethics statement:

'Institutional review board: Ethical review board, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Approval numbers: 2014-WOP-3498 and 2017-COP-8050

Consent obtained written online anonymously'

a. Please amend your current ethics statement to confirm that your named institutional review board or ethics committee specifically approved this study.

b. Once you have amended this/these statement(s) in the Methods section of the manuscript, please add the same text to the “Ethics Statement” field of the submission form (via “Edit Submission”).

Response: We have amended the ethics statements in the Methods sections of Study 1 (p. 6) and Study 2 (p. 14), respectively and we have added the same text to the “Ethics Statement” field of the submission form.

Responses to Reviewer #1:

The paper tackles an interesting and important topic, it is well written and all analyses are described clearly, including limitations and indicating which aspects where exploratory or previously hypothesized.

I thus have only a few minor comments:

Response: Thank you for the overall positive evaluation of our work and your constructive comments.

1. the authors remain a bit silent about which online participant pools they use. Is this something comparable to MTurk, or are these student participants?

Response: The online participant pool (Mage=23.78) was recruited from passers-by at a German university campus as well as through social media. We have added this information on page 6.

2. Some of the arguments for the difference in effects between the first study and previous studies are based on arguments about the German Railway norms, however, the second study then is (again, as previous studies, I guess) done in the Netherlands. It would be interesting to understand whether this - as opposed to the design differences - plays a role for the effects, whether norms and norm abidance are perceived differently in the two systems.

Response: There are cultural differences as well as similarities between the two countries on dimensions that are relevant to norm violation. Germany scores higher than the Netherlands on cultural tightness, which relates to the importance that is attached to rules and the severity of punishment for violations (Gelfand et al., 2011). In Study 1 (German sample) we found that non-sanctioned norm abiders were perceived to have violated norms to a greater extent than sanctioned norm abiders, although the effect size was small. We could speculate that participants were aware of the railway operators’ right to fine the traveler and – due to their tightness - were indignant that the traveler got away without this fine.

Germany and the Netherlands are comparable in terms of individualism, the degree to which uniqueness, personal achievement, and self-expression are valued (as opposed to group harmony and collective outcomes). A cross-cultural comparison of responses to norm violations (including data from Germany and the Netherlands) revealed that particularly respondents from individualistic cultures (including Germany and the Netherlands) perceive norm violators as more powerful than norm abiders (Stamkou et al., 2019).

Finally, regarding the specific scenario in this study, we would like to note that Germany and the Netherlands are European Schengen states, allowing free traveling among these states, and therefore use similar terms and conditions for train travel. In the discussion section, we now address the possibility of cultural differences as a subject for future research.

3. the authors themselves discuss that one problem with the results is the hypothetical character. There are by now several studies from the team of Marie-Claire Villeval (Lyon) which use real settings to study similar questions. I am wondering whether the authors are aware of this research and whether they might consider doing more real world studies in the future.

Response: The work by Villeval and her colleagues (e.g., Dai et al., 2018) is very interesting and employs creative methods. Importantly, this work is mainly focused on the intrapersonal drivers of norm breaking behaviors (e.g., what determines cheating behavior in individuals) and not on interpersonal dynamics (i.e., how do others respond to observing individuals who violate the norms), which is the approach we take in our work.

Responses to norm violations can indeed be studied in various ways, which entail different trade-offs between ecological validity and experimental control. We have used a variety of approaches in our work, including scenarios, pictures, video clips, recalled situations, and live interactions with trained actors to investigate responses to norm violations (Stamkou et al., 2016, 2018, 2019; Van Kleef et al., 2011, 2012). Scenarios, pictures, and video clips afford greater experimental control, whereas recalled situations and live interactions afford greater ecological validity. Which method is most suitable in a given study depends on the nature of the research question in combination with the possibilities and constraints of the different methodological approaches. For the current project, we prioritized experimental control to enable causal conclusions about the effects of sanctioning on responses to norm violators. Although we acknowledge the limitations of the scenario approach, we have found in our previous work that results obtained in scenario studies were very consistent with results obtained in richer yet less controlled settings. We are therefore confident in the validity of the current findings. Nonetheless, we see value in validating and extending the current findings using more ecologically valid procedures, and in the revised paper we explicitly call for future research using such procedures (see p. 22).

References (not mentioned in the paper):

Dai, Z., Galeotti, F., & Villeval, M. C. (2018). Cheating in the lab predicts fraud in the field: An experiment in public transportation. Management Science, 64(3), 1081-1100.

Stamkou, E., Van Kleef, G. A., & Homan, A. C. (2018). The art of influence: When and why deviant artists gain impact. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 115, 276-303.

4. in their motivational examples, the authors always use firm contexts (interrupting colleagues etc.) - why do they then choose railway examples for the study?

Response: We have used the railway scenario because all study participants can easily imagine this setting and most likely have experience with the described situation. In our previous work (see references comment 3), we have used organizational, educational, artistic, and personal settings to study responses to norm violators and found that effects were consistent across settings.

5. my main issue is actually with the signaling idea. If norm violation signals power through being a potentially costly volitional behavior, sanctioning should not necessarily reduce perceived power. The study actually cannot scrutinize this link, as it is a one-shot behavior that is being described. If there were no sanctions, it wouldn´t be costly signaling. Thus, the described mechanism could only work if norm violators keep violating even though there is a chance of being sanctioned - which implies, that in some cases they will be fined, in others not. The design is as it is, but I would like to see a more thorough discussion of this.

Response: There is considerable evidence that individuals who violate norms are perceived by others as powerful (for a recent review, see Stamkou, Homan, & Van Kleef, 2020). The theoretical rationale underlying this prediction is that people who violate norms signal that they experience the leeway to act as they please despite normative constraints (Van Kleef et al., 2011). This is a freedom that typically comes with higher rank (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Accordingly, research has shown that people who violate norms are perceived as having high power (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2011), status (e.g., Bellezza et al., 2014), and influence (e.g., Stamkou et al., 2018). Regarding the used scenario, individuals who do not buy a train ticket run a (high) risk of being sanctioned. Therefore, by not buying a ticket they signal to be oblivious to normative constraints and can behave as they wish (volition typically reserved for the powerful), which elicit power perceptions in observers. Our study shows that sanctions attenuated the signal of power that norm violator’s apparent volition sends. Observers likely conclude that the sanctioned norm violator does not have the power he seemed to have. In future studies, it would indeed be interesting to investigate how observers will respond to norm violators who keep violating even after having been sanctioned. We added this suggestion to the general discussion section.

References (not mentioned in the paper):

Stamkou, E., Homan, A. C., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2020). Climbing the ladder or falling from grace? A threat-opportunity framework of the effects of norm violations on social rank. Current Opinion in Psychology, 33, 74-79.

Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Gruenfeld, D. H, Whitson, J. A., & Liljenquist, K. A. (2008). Power reduces the press of the situation: Implications for creativity, conformity, and dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 1450–1466.

Responses to Reviewer #2:

The study deals with an interesting and important topic related to social norms. The methods sound appropriate to test the hypotheses.

I now focus on issues that would help to improve this manuscript:

Response: Thank you for this positive comment to our work and your suggestions for improvement.

1. One major issue with this paper is the need to explicate social norms. The literature has been well-documented with norms being conceptualized as injunctive norms and descriptive norms. The association between norms and social sanction has been extensively discussed in the work of Cialdini et al. (1990), Fishbein and Ajzen (2011), and Lapinski and Rimal (2005). Injunctive norms refer to what ought to be done while descriptive norms pertaining to the prevalence of a behavior. Thus, this study seems to intend to deal with injunctive norms rather than descriptive norms. Further, social norms and law are distinct concept (see Rimal & Lapinski, 2015). This study does not seem to distinguish law violation from norm violation. I would think this paper focuses on law and legal sanction, rather a norm-based approach.

Response: Although there is a clear conceptual distinction between descriptive and injunctive norms, many common norm violations fall in both categories (Van Kleef, Gelfand, & Jetten, 2019). This is because behaviors that are endorsed as appropriate by the majority of the members of a group (injunctive norms) also tend to be enacted by the majority of the members of a group (descriptive norms). Accordingly, almost all prior research on responses to norm violators has examined behaviors that would be considered violations of both descriptive and injunctive norms. For instance, studies examined responses to individuals who would come in late for a work meeting (Stamkou et al., 2019), put their feet on someone else’s table (Van Kleef et al., 2011), take someone else’s coffee (Van Kleef et al., 2012), park their bike in an illegal spot (Stamkou et al., 2016), or dress improperly for a (professional) occasion (Bellezza, Gino, & Keinan, 2014; Oostrom, Ronay, & Van Kleef, 2021). These are all behaviors that simultaneously infringe on injunctive norms (most people disapprove of these behaviors) and descriptive norms (most people do not exhibit these behaviors). The same is true for the norm violation examined in the current work: Most people believe it is appropriate to buy a train ticket (injunctive norm) and most people indeed do so (descriptive norm). The current operationalization thus reflects the natural conflation of descriptive and injunctive norms in real life. That said, it would be interesting to investigate in future research whether the moderating effect of sanctioning also applies to “pure” violations of descriptive versus injunctive norms. We now refer to descriptive and injunctive norms in the introduction section and we have added this suggestion for future research in the general discussion section.

The reviewer is correct in noting that we did not draw an explicit distinction between social and legal violations. Conceptually, we see legal violations as a subset of the broader category of norm violations. That is, people may violate norms in ways that are or are not punishable, depending on the nature of the infringement and the broader context (e.g., a national law system). In our previous work, we have seen that legal norm violations such as financial fraud (Van Kleef et al., 2011) or illegal parking (Stamkou et al., 2016) elicit similar responses from observers as non-legal norm violations such as arriving late to a meeting (Stamkou et al., 2019) or putting one’s feet on another’s table (Van Kleef et al., 2011): The recurring pattern across these and various other behaviors is that norm violators are perceived by others as powerful. In the revised introduction, we have made it explicit that our focus in the current research was on legal norm violations. Additionally, in the general discussion section (limitations and future directions) we note that previous research indicates that legal and non-legal norm violations elicit similar social responses (p. 23).

References (not mentioned in the paper):

Oostrom, J. K., Ronay, R., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2021). The signalling effects of nonconforming dress style in personnel selection contexts: Do applicants’ qualifications matter? European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 30, 70-82.

2. Similarly, the explication of the power concept is limited. Authors define power as the perceived potential to influence others, which is not real power (individuals might not actually hold that power, but only are perceived by others). The lack of explication makes the conceptualization and operationalization of this variable sound less convincing. When we read/see a person not buying a bus ticket, there is little ground to argue that others would think the violator has a great deal of power. The authors use an example of people violating the talking norms in meetings to illustrate their point, but these two contexts are fundamentally different: Some people can talk freely in meetings because they either have real power or the behavior could actually be part of the organizational norms (the meeting norm is that you can interrupt others' talk if you do have something important to say). I would not think a traveler who did not conform to the law as having "a great deal of power," not mentioning that they told lies to authorities. I would think that someone escaping a law sanction as a lucky individual and that should be inferred as the person having power, unless he/she has further actions (ex: making a phone call to powerful others, which is a form of reference power). Such definition and operationalization as written in the paper, therefore, do not sound convincing to me.

Response: There is considerable evidence that individuals who violate norms are perceived by others as powerful (for a recent review, see Stamkou, Homan, & Van Kleef, 2020). The theoretical rationale underlying this prediction is that people who violate norms signal that they experience the leeway to act as they please despite normative constraints (Van Kleef et al., 2011). This is a freedom that typically comes with higher rank (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Accordingly, research has shown that people who violate norms are perceived as having high power (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2011), status (e.g., Bellezza et al., 2014), and influence (e.g., Stamkou et al., 2018). Furthermore, there is evidence that these perceptions can, under particular circumstances, fuel actual granting of power, for instance via the conferral of control over outcomes, voting, and leadership endorsement (Stamkou et al., 2016; Van Kleef et al., 2012). Our two studies have shown that even individuals who did not buy a train ticket were perceived as more powerful. To acknowledge that our research speaks to perceived power, we have made this explicit throughout the paper (e.g., p. 4, pp. 9-13, pp. 15-17, p. 20, p. 22).

References (not mentioned in the paper):

Stamkou, E., Homan, A. C., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2020). Climbing the ladder or falling from grace? A threat-opportunity framework of the effects of norm violations on social rank. Current Opinion in Psychology, 33, 74-79.

Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Gruenfeld, D. H, Whitson, J. A., & Liljenquist, K. A. (2008). Power reduces the press of the situation: Implications for creativity, conformity, and dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 1450–1466.

3. I see that it is quite controversial to argue that freedom to do something would always lead to inferences of power possession. It might only signal power as the authors suggest under some certain conditions (there should be boundary conditions). I would think that people can think of someone who acts as she/he wants, which deviates from social approval, as having less power. This rival theory can be illustrated, for example, by historical accounts related to social movements in which less powerful individuals in a society (both real and perceived) violate a political norm/law to gain power. We may also see drivers overspeed and think of them as traffic violators who would likely confront more powerful others (policemen). This social comparison will likely lead to perceptions of the violators as being less powerful, or even having no power and thus defying law to satisfy their desired power. In the same vein, a person did not buy a ticket might mean he/she has no other choice (lack of freedom) and thus violates the law (no power). This line of reasoning shows that the theorization of the model in this paper seems problematic because the authors left too many rival theories unaddressed.

Response: Please, see our response to your comment 2 and the recent review of Stamkou et al., 2020. In our paper we recognize that potentially costly behavior (e.g., a norm violation) can only act as a signal of an underlying trait (e.g., power) in the absence of additional cues that provide direct information about that trait (see p. 4). Hence, norm violation may not signal power to the same degree when additional information is available. Yet, if additional information is lacking (which seems also the case in your example of the speedy driver), bystanders tend to ascribe power to the norm violator as has been repeatedly demonstrated in prior research and in the current study. We stress this in the discussion section on pp. 21-22. To our best knowledge, our study is one of the few examining a boundary condition, namely sanctioning. Future research could investigate other boundary conditions, such as the background of the norm violator (which can act as an additional information cue). For instance, if people are aware of the power of the person violating the norm – a situation that you raise in your comment above – this should act as a moderator of the effect. Distantly speaking to your comment, we have some unpublished research that suggests that outgroup members breaking the norm are not seen as more powerful, whereas ingroup members who break the norm are seen as more powerful. We have added this suggestion to the discussion section (p. 22).

4. When theorization is not sound, having supporting data does not help much. The three key variables likely often have some sorts of correlations. A statistical model can be statistically significant without any theoretical background. Plus, the idea that someone has power could have more freedom to do things, even violating a law is not new in the literature. Also, the idea of sanctioning someone reducing his/her power offers no novel theoretical implication (someone goes to jail of course will normally have much less power than before). I do not see how such theorizations add to the literature.

Response: The key contribution of our study is not that sanctioning reduces power per se, but that sanctioning reduces the effect of norm violation on power perceptions. Our work is based on costly signaling theory (Bergmüller et al., 2007; Zahavi, 1995) and prior empirical evidence for the norm violation � volition � power chain (see Stamkou et al., 2020). A robust finding (in individualistic societies) is that norm violators are perceived by others as powerful and high status. This is important, because people often defer to (and are less likely to speak up to) others whom they perceive as powerful (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich 2013). Moreover, norm violators are sometimes granted power and leadership due to the impression they make on others, and this increased power in turn makes future violations more likely (Van Kleef, Wanders, Stamkou, & Homan, 2015). To the degree that this vicious cycle is a cause for concern, it is important to understand how it can be broken. The current research provides first evidence that sanctioning can sever the link between norm violation and power perceptions, thereby disrupting a potentially toxic spiral of norm violation and power abuse. Future research can build on our work and provide further evidence for the role of sanctions or other punishing responses (e.g., informal (social) punishment) in preventing people from gaining influence through norm violations.

References (not mentioned in the paper):

Cheng JT, Tracy JL, Foulsham T, Kingstone A, Henrich J. Two ways to the top: evidence that dominance and prestige are distinct yet viable avenues to social rank and influence. J Pers. Soc. Psychol. 2013; 104(1). 103–125. doi: 10.1037/a0030398.

That says, I commend the authors on engaging in a project with a rigorously methodological design. I sincerely appreciate the author(s)’ work, and I wish them the best of luck with this project.

Response: We appreciate your challenging and constructive comments.

Responses to Reviewer #3:

This manuscript reports two experiments designed to test the hypothesis that norm violators will appear less powerful when they are punished than when they are not. The experiments build on earlier research showing that norm violators are perceived as more powerful than norm abiders; they introduce sanctions as a moderator of this effect.

The manuscript has a number of strengths: The research is methodologically sound; the analyses are appropriate; the write-up is clear and complete. At the same time, the research makes a very modest contribution to the literature, even more modest than the write-up suggests. It mainly shows that an effect previously demonstrated by these investigators has limited scope. It is good to know that, of course, but it does not represent the level of contribution typically found in PLOS ONE articles.

Response: Thank you for your positive but also critical general comment.

Let me describe briefly how I would interpret the results of this research, as my interpretation is somewhat different from how the authors frame the results. These results demonstrate that in a situation in which there are rules for how to behave, people are sensitive to where the power lies: with the rules or with the individuals. (I’m using rules here, rather than norms, because the research scenario conflates the two, but the same analysis holds for norms.) To the extent that people follow the rules and violations of the rules are enforced, power lies with the rules; to the extent that people violate the rules and get away with it, power lies with the individuals. Volition, on the other hand, depends on whether people try to follow the rules. Study 1 shows that neither rule-abiders nor rule-violators have much power if the rules are enforced, but if the rules are not enforced, even people who accidentally violate them (by not having their ticket to present to the conductor) have power. Study 2 shows that rules are powerful when people abide by them and when they are enforced; the relationship between individual volition and power is strongest when rules are weak. This summary captures all of the findings of this research and is entirely consistent with current views of how social rules and norms work. They clarify that the earlier finding of greater power attributed to norm violators holds only when norms are weak, but that simply serves to limit the scope and importance of the earlier finding. It does not challenge or extend current understandings of the way norms work.

I will leave to the editor the decision of whether this manuscript makes enough of a contribution to warrant publication in PLOS ONE. Regardless of where it is published, I think some revision is in order to simplify and clarify the presentation and interpretation of the results.

Response: Our research is indeed built on solid theory and prior empirical evidence. We believe it is valuable to test theory in different context and with different methods. Also, it is good science to examine the boundary conditions of a theory. In this study, we do both: replicating prior evidence - but now in an experimental context where a legal norm is violated - and testing a boundary condition (sanctioning). Indeed, we show that norm violators gain more power in the eyes of bystanders when norms are not enforced by sanctions, which we believe is a highly relevant finding for dealing with norm violating behaviors in society. This finding may also hold for the violation of non-legal norms where the sanction is not a fine established by law or official rule but rather depends on the responses of bystanders. We plan further research into the ‘self-reinforcing loop’, by which norm violators appear powerful, bystanders submit to and consolidate the power of the norm violators and thus encourage further norm violation, can be broken (see p. 22). Based on your comment and the comments of the other reviewers we revised the text of the paper to clarify our conceptualizations and the interpretation of the results (see pp. 5, 21-24).

Responses to Reviewer #4:

Summary of the paper

The authors (1) replicate previous research that third-party observers believe that norm violators have a greater volition and power than norm abiders, and (2) extend that research to understand whether sanctions can be used to reduce perceptions of power associated with norm violation. The authors conduct two studies: (1) with a German online sample and a 2X2 design (Abiding norm, violating norm)X(Sanctions, No Sanctions) and (2) with a Dutch online sample with 1X3 design (Abiding Norm), (Violating Norm X Sanctions), (Violating Norm X No Sanctions).

The authors use a vignette about a passenger buying or not buying a ticket on a train, and a controller either sanctioning (or not) the passenger who fails to show a ticket. They measure survey respondents’ perceptions of the passenger’s volition and power using survey questions. The authors claim that the main mechanism of how norm violation affects power is through volition i.e., a passenger who violates a norm is considered to act on their own volition, and this belief about volition leads to increased perceptions about the power they possess. The authors find that sanctions reduce the perceptions of power of the passenger irrespective of whether they are norm abiding or not, and irrespective of their volition (Result of Study 1). They find weak evidence for the mechanism that norm violation affects power through volition.

The paper is well-written, and the data collection and analysis are well-done.

Response: Thank you for your positive assessment of our work and your detailed comments.

Major critique

1. The paper clearly shows that introduction of sanctions reduces power associated with both norm-abiding and norm-violating individuals. However, the mechanism that norm violation leads to increased volition that further leads to increased power is not supported by evidence. The authors cannot claim that the mechanism is true unless they vary volition exogenously and find that perceptions of power are affected by that variation.

Response: There is ample evidence from previous work that individuals who violate norms are perceived by others as having high volitional capacity, which in turn fuels perceptions of power and influence (e.g., Bellezza et al., 2014; Stamkou et al., 2018; Van Kleef et al., 2011). We replicate this link between volition and power. However, we agree that we didn’t manipulate volition and thus cannot claim causal evidence for this link. We address this point in the limitations and future directions section of the manuscript (see p. 22).

2. The results from Study 1 suggest that introduction of sanctions reduce perceptions of passenger’s power irrespective of his/her volition and his/her norm abidance/violation. In study 2, the authors find a different result because that they do not have a treatment with sanctions for norm-abiding behavior in this Study and thus do not have much variation in volition. I don’t think we can conclude from Study 2 that the claimed mechanism (Norm Violation-->Increased volition-->Increased power) is true.

Response: The issue of sanctions for norm-abiding behavior is something we discussed at length in the author team. On the one hand, from the point of view of having orthogonal manipulations and allowing different comparisons between conditions, it is indeed desirable to include a condition in which norm-abiding behavior is sanctioned. On the other hand, from the point of view of validity, including such a condition is not desirable as it undermines the credibility of the scenario and makes the interpretation of comparisons with that condition less straightforward. We solved this dilemma by running two studies, one of each type, so that the disadvantages of one approach are remedied by the advantages of the other approach. We believe that in conjunction the two studies provide reasonable support for the presumed theoretical mechanism of volitional capacity. We have made these considerations more explicit in the revision (introduction Study 2 and limitations in the general discussion section; p. 13 and 21 respectively).

3. Moreover, volition and power are correlated. However, there is no evidence that it is higher volition that leads to greater power. It could be the other way round where higher power leads to having greater volition.

Response: Please, see our response to your comment 1.

4. It is not clear what “power” means in the context of a passenger who either buys or does not buy a ticket on a train. How does not buying a ticket make one more influential? A better way to measure power in this situation would be to see if the third-party observer is more likely to follow instructions from someone who violated the norm versus who obeyed the norm.

Response: There is considerable evidence that individuals who violate norms are perceived by others as powerful (for a recent review, see Stamkou, Homan, & Van Kleef, 2020). The theoretical rationale underlying this prediction is that people who violate norms signal that they experience the leeway to act as they please despite normative constraints (Van Kleef et al., 2011). This is a freedom that typically comes with higher rank (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Accordingly, research has shown that people who violate norms are perceived as having high power (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2011), status (e.g., Bellezza et al., 2014), and influence (e.g., Stamkou et al., 2018). Furthermore, there is evidence that these perceptions can, under particular circumstances, fuel actual granting of power, for instance via the conferral of control over outcomes, voting, and leadership endorsement (Stamkou et al., 2016; Van Kleef et al., 2012). Replicating previous studies, we also found that norm violation - operationalized as a passenger who did not buy a ticket on a train - elicited perceptions of power. Since people tend to submit to powerful others (DeRue & Ashford, 2010; Epitropaki et al., 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2012) it would indeed be valuable to investigate - in a similar context as in the current study - if observers are also more likely to follow instructions from norm violators (p. 22). Thank you for this interesting suggestion. We have added it to the general discussion section.

5. The payment to participants is small and probabilistic. For example, the participants had a 20% chance of winning a 10Euro voucher in Study 2. It is unclear how seriously the participants took the survey with these small incentives.

Response: We are confident that our findings are based on data of participants who took the survey seriously. First, we excluded participants who did not finish the questionnaire and therefore did not invest enough effort. Second, we excluded participants who failed the attention checks. Third, the manipulation checks showed that the intended differences between conditions in the presence or absence of norm violation and sanctions were achieved. Finally, although we believe that all participants who completed the questionnaire were sufficiently motivated, participants were randomly assigned to conditions and thus we may assume that participants’ motivation is the same across conditions.

6. The authors use a vignette about the norm of buying a ticket or not on a train. The authors may want to discuss how this specific situation can be generalized to other situations.

Response: Previous work has revealed that very different norm violations across a variety of settings have very similar effects on perceptions of power. For instance, studies examined responses to individuals who would come in late for a work meeting (Stamkou et al., 2019), put their feet on someone else’s table (Van Kleef et al., 2011), take someone else’s coffee (Van Kleef et al., 2012), park their bike in an illegal spot (Stamkou et al., 2016), or dress improperly for a (professional) occasion (Bellezza, Gino, & Keinan, 2014; Oostrom, Ronay, & Van Kleef, 2021). These are all behaviors that people typically neither approve nor exhibit. The same is true for the norm violation examined in the current work: Most people find it appropriate to buy a train ticket and they behave accordingly. All in all, we believe that the findings reported in the current paper are likely to generalize to other types of norm violations and other settings.

References (not mentioned in the paper):

Oostrom, J. K., Ronay, R., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2021). The signalling effects of nonconforming dress style in personnel selection contexts: Do applicants’ qualifications matter? European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 30, 70-82.

Minor critique

1. When you say norms, can you clarify if they are descriptive or prescriptive norms?

Response: Although there is a clear conceptual distinction between descriptive and prescriptive (injunctive) norms, many common norm violations fall in both categories (Van Kleef, Gelfand, & Jetten, 2019). This is because behaviors that are endorsed as appropriate by the majority of the members of a group also tend to be enacted by the majority of the members of a group. Accordingly, almost all prior research on responses to norm violators has examined behaviors that would be considered violations of both descriptive and injunctive norms (see Bellezza et al., 2014; Oostrom et al., 2021; Stamkou et al., 2016; Stamkou et al., 2019; Van Kleef et al., 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2012). The same is true for the norm violation examined in the current work: Most people believe it is appropriate to buy a train ticket and most people indeed do so. The current operationalization thus reflects the natural conflation of descriptive and injunctive norms in real life. We now refer to descriptive and injunctive norms in the introduction section of the revised paper.

2. Both the sanction and no sanction conditions in the paper technically have sanctions, in one case they are enforced and in another they are not. The authors can clarify that by changing their terminology.

Response: We agree that not buying a train ticket carries the risk of a formal penalty that may be enforced or not. The sanctioning in our paper refers to a formal (legal) rather than an informal (social) punishment. Depending on the experimental condition in Study 1, a sanction was imposed or not when the violator exhibited sanctionable behavior, that is, could not show a ticket to the controller (see page 14). In the overview of our study (page 5) we now state that sanctions refer to formal sanctions.

3. 75% of the sample is women and is not representative of the German population in Study 1. The authors may want to discuss how the gender composition of their sample may affect the result.

Response: We agree that the gender composition in Study 1 is not representative for the German population. However, we have no specific assumptions about possible gender differences in individual responses to the violation of legal norms. Moreover, participants were randomly assigned to conditions and the findings of the two studies are largely the same and in line with previous research. We now discuss the gender composition of our studies in the general discussion section (p. 23).

4. Since Study 1 and 2 are conducted with different populations (German vs Dutch online samples), the others should comment on how comparable these studies are. Are there differences in norms of ticket buying in these two populations?

Response: There are cultural differences as well as similarities between the two countries in dimensions that are relevant to norm violation. Germany scores higher than the Netherlands on cultural tightness, which relates to the importance that is attached to rules and the severity of punishment for violations (Gelfand et al., 2011). In Study 1 (German sample) we found that non-sanctioned norm abiders were perceived to have violated norms to a greater extent than sanctioned norm abiders, although the effect size was small. We could speculate that participants were aware of the railway operators’ right to fine the traveler and – due to their tightness - were indignant that the traveler got away without this fine.

Germany and the Netherlands are comparable in terms of individualism, the degree to which uniqueness, personal achievement, and self-expression are valued (as opposed to group harmony and collective outcomes). A cross-cultural comparison of responses to norm violations (including data from Germany and the Netherlands) revealed that particularly respondents from individualistic cultures (including Germany and the Netherlands) perceive norm violators as more powerful than norm abiders (Stamkou et al., 2019).

Finally, regarding the specific scenario in this study, we would like to note that Germany and the Netherlands are European Schengen states, allowing free traveling among these states, and therefore use similar terms and conditions for train travel. In the discussion section (p. 24), we now address the possibility of cultural differences as a subject for future research.

Attachment

Submitted filename: Response to reviewers.docx

Decision Letter 1

21 May 2021

PONE-D-20-25007R1

How norm violators rise and fall in the eyes of others: The role of sanctions

PLOS ONE

Dear Dr. van Vianen,

Thank you for submitting your manuscript to PLOS ONE. After careful consideration, we feel that it has merit but does not fully meet PLOS ONE’s publication criteria as it currently stands. Therefore, we invite you to submit a revised version of the manuscript that addresses the points raised during the review process.

In the revised version of the paper, please try to clarify the aspects related to descriptive and injunctive norms, how the perceived power has been measured, the specificity / limitations of the study. When revising the paper, please consider the reviewers' comments listed at the bottom of the email.

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Reviewers' comments:

Reviewer's Responses to Questions

Comments to the Author

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Reviewer #1: All comments have been addressed

Reviewer #2: (No Response)

Reviewer #3: All comments have been addressed

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Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

Reviewer #3: (No Response)

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3. Has the statistical analysis been performed appropriately and rigorously?

Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

Reviewer #3: (No Response)

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Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: (No Response)

Reviewer #3: (No Response)

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Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

Reviewer #3: (No Response)

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6. Review Comments to the Author

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Reviewer #1: Thank you for considering my comments carefully. I do not fully agree with your take on the signaling part, but your arguments are solid, and it is rather an empirical question whether your take is right, I think. As you refer it to further research, I think that´s sufficient.

Reviewer #2: I appreciate the authors’ efforts to address reviewers’ comments. I have these questions for the authors to clarify:

1. Descriptive and injunctive norms were not clearly defined in the revised manuscript. These norms are individually perceived. Social norms can be examined at the collective level, which is different from social norm existing at the individual/perceived level. At the collective level, both types of norms can converge, but not necessarily so at the perceived level. People are not always cognizant of the prevailing descriptive or injunctive norms in certain contexts (please see Tankard & Paluck, 2016). The social norm approach, therefore, suggests that misperception of social norms is a problematic issue for norm-violating behaviors (please see Berkowitz, 2005).

The authors wrote that injunctive norms and descriptive norms almost always work in the same directions. They wrote that behaviors that are endorsed as appropriate by the majority of the members of a group (injunctive norms) also tend to be enacted by the majority of the members of a group (descriptive norms). However, there are many situations where these two types of normative influences do not overlap, such as when people approve of, but do not practice, particular behaviors (Cialdini et al., 1990). Descriptive norms and injunctive norms can also be antagonistic, and they may provide us with conflicting information about normative behaviors in a given context (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). For example, consider these norm-violating behaviors: drinking, smoking, speeding, etc. (please see, for example, Chung & Rimal, 2016; Hue et al., 2015).

The authors responded that “almost all prior research on responses to norm violators has examined behaviors that would be considered violations of both descriptive and injunctive norms.” Perhaps, this manuscript needs to speak for itself as to why these two types of norms are almost all considered in such a way? Also, it might be necessary to address other theoretical frameworks that argue otherwise. For instance, the focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990), the theory of normative social behavior (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005), the reasoned action approach (Fishbein, 2009) suggest that violation of injunctive norms does not necessarily go along with violation of descriptive norms, and vice versa.

The authors commented that they see legal violations as a subset of the broader category of norm violations. So, it looks like this research approach suggests that violating the law also means violating social norms. To this point, please address this argument from social norm theorists:

“Different from laws, norms are socially negotiated and contextually dependent modes of conduct; laws are explicitly codified proscriptions that link violations with their corresponding punitive measures. Laws are not socially negotiated (although their enforcement might be), whereas norms and their transgressions, by definition, are negotiated through social interaction. This is an important criterion because it explains why the same mode of conduct (e.g., littering) is acceptable in one social context (littered environment) but not in another (clean environment; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). Laws and norms can certainly reinforce each other. For example, smokers may choose to refrain from lighting up in a public place for a number of reasons, including legal (fear of being penalized) or normative (fear of being accosted by someone in the vicinity), both of which lead to the same outcome (not lighting up). At other times, the two may act in opposition to each other, as when underage college students follow alcohol-drinking norms despite this behavior being illegal.” (page 394, Rimal & Lapinski, 2015)

Berkowitz, A. D. (2005). An overview of the social norms approach. Changing the culture of college drinking: A socially situated health communication campaign, 1, 193-214.

Chung, A., & Rimal, R. N. (2016). Social norms: A review. Review of Communication Research, 4, 1-28.

Hue, D.T., Brennan, L., Parker, L. & Florian, M. (2015). But I am normal: Safe driving in Vietnam. Journal of Social Marketing, 5(2), 105-124.

Lapinski, M. K., & Rimal, R. N. (2005). An explication of social norms. Communication Theory, 15(2), 127-147.

Rimal, R. N., & Lapinski, M. K. (2015). A re-explication of social norms, ten years later. Communication Theory, 25(4), 393-409.

Tankard, M. E., & Paluck, E. L. (2016). Norm perception as a vehicle for social change. Social Issues and Policy Review, 10(1), 181-211.

2. This study focuses on the association between norm violation and perception of power. The authors defined power as the perceived potential to influence others. Additionally, they suggested that the perception of someone having the capacity to do what that someone wants, it signals that the person has the capacity to influence others (perception of power; line 58-60, page 4). Following this logic, a person who does not buy a ticket is perceived as having the potential to influence others. I am still confused with this logic. How is it possible that we travel on a bus and witness a stranger not buying a ticket would make us think that that person has the potential to influence us and others? In this scenario, I might think that the person possesses some degrees of autonomy to conduct such a behavior. Yet, autonomy is conceptually different from power and does not always lead to the attribution of power. So, an inference from a high degree of autonomy to a high level of power sounds like a leap in logic. The authors cited several studies to back up this argument in their response, but the manuscript should speak for itself considering that this is a pivotal theorization in this study.

Additionally, the authors wrote that “people who violate norms demonstrate that they can behave as they wish.” How do we tell if people would attribute someone who does not buy a ticket either as the person wishes to do so or that the person has no choice at all? If the attribution is related to the second scenario, does that still mean that the person is perceived to have the capacity to influence others? This situation seems to relate to observers’ perceptions of efficacy of a norm violator as well as observers’ attributions of the norm violator's traits. Attribution theory suggests that human tends to attribute others’ negative behaviors as causally due to internal factors and with less positive traits (e.g., fundamental attribution errors). As such, a norm violator can be attributed with more negative attributes (e.g., poor, desperate) than positive attributes (e.g., rich, high self-efficacy). Isn’t it logical to think that positive attributes would be more likely to associate with higher perception of power?

3. Operationalization of perceived power: It might be helpful to see the specific items used to measure perceived power. Right now, the manuscript says that the authors measured this construct by items like “I think this person has a great deal of power,” which does not tell if participants understood that power was about the potential ability to influence themselves and others. It would also be more informative for reviewers and readers to see the specific items measuring other scales because the items were adapted to this research situation.

4. What has been the common context of the studies the authors cited? Were these studies mostly conducted in the western context where law and order and transportation infrastructure are to some extent more stable than that in developing countries? It is hard to fathom that a thieve on a public bus in a non-western country (norm violator) would be perceived by on-lookers as having the potential to influence others (power). It is also hard to think of an illegal drug user as being someone who has power to influence others. I wonder if there is such a line of research related to this study’s main theoretical framework to be able to be generalized with a global implication. Even in the review of Stamkou et al. (2021) that the authors cited, this norm violation – perceived power linkage was shown to have contradicting effects in India. To this point, I still see that there’s a significant challenge to persuade readers of the causal link between the observation of norm-violation behaviors and perceived power.

5. The citation of perceived norm types should be acknowledged to Cialdini et al. (1990) who coined the terms, which then became widely adopted in social science.

6. The term “costly behavior” should be clearly defined and with an example. Perhaps, not all readers will have the in-depth knowledge of the authors’ research discipline.

Reviewer #3: (No Response)

**********

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Reviewer #2: No

Reviewer #3: No

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Author response to Decision Letter 1

28 Jun 2021

Responses to Editor comments

Thank you for submitting your manuscript to PLOS ONE. After careful consideration, we feel that it has merit but does not fully meet PLOS ONE’s publication criteria as it currently stands. Therefore, we invite you to submit a revised version of the manuscript that addresses the points raised during the review process.

Response: Thank you for giving us the opportunity to submit a second revised version of our manuscript.

In the revised version of the paper, please try to clarify the aspects related to descriptive and injunctive norms, how the perceived power has been measured, the specificity / limitations of the study. When revising the paper, please consider the reviewers' comments listed at the bottom of the email.

Response: We have carefully considered the comments of Reviewer 2 and clarified the concepts of descriptive and injunctive norms, the measurement of perceived power, and the limitations of the study.

Responses to Reviewer #2:

I appreciate the authors’ efforts to address reviewers’ comments.

Response: Thank you for your additional and helpful comments.

1. Descriptive and injunctive norms were not clearly defined in the revised manuscript. These norms are individually perceived. Social norms can be examined at the collective level, which is different from social norm existing at the individual/perceived level. At the collective level, both types of norms can converge, but not necessarily so at the perceived level. People are not always cognizant of the prevailing descriptive or injunctive norms in certain contexts (please see Tankard & Paluck, 2016). The social norm approach, therefore, suggests that misperception of social norms is a problematic issue for norm-violating behaviors (please see Berkowitz, 2005).

Response: Thank you for your concrete suggestion for better defining descriptive and injunctive norms. In the revised manuscript, we now state on page 3: “Injunctive and descriptive norms are individually perceived but when people are cognizant of prevailing norms and endorse these norms, both types of norms can converge and be shared at the collective level [18]”.

Also, please note that in our studies, people did perceive the behavior of the norm violator to be violating of norms (which is evident from the strong main effects on the manipulation check; eta squared = .845 in S1, and eta squared = .715 in S2). So, even though not everyone is always aware of the prevailing (descriptive or injunctive) norms in a certain situation, the behavior we studied in our research seems to be perceived consistently across participants.

The authors wrote that injunctive norms and descriptive norms almost always work in the same directions. They wrote that behaviors that are endorsed as appropriate by the majority of the members of a group (injunctive norms) also tend to be enacted by the majority of the members of a group (descriptive norms). However, there are many situations where these two types of normative influences do not overlap, such as when people approve of, but do not practice, particular behaviors (Cialdini et al., 1990). Descriptive norms and injunctive norms can also be antagonistic, and they may provide us with conflicting information about normative behaviors in a given context (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). For example, consider these norm-violating behaviors: drinking, smoking, speeding, etc. (please see, for example, Chung & Rimal, 2016; Hue et al., 2015).

The authors responded that “almost all prior research on responses to norm violators has examined behaviors that would be considered violations of both descriptive and injunctive norms.” Perhaps, this manuscript needs to speak for itself as to why these two types of norms are almost all considered in such a way? Also, it might be necessary to address other theoretical frameworks that argue otherwise. For instance, the focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990), the theory of normative social behavior (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005), the reasoned action approach (Fishbein, 2009) suggest that violation of injunctive norms does not necessarily go along with violation of descriptive norms, and vice versa.

Response: We fully agree that there are situations in which descriptive and injunctive norms do not overlap and that violation of injunctive norms does not necessarily go along with violation of descriptive norms. Your comment led us to realize that the claims we made about the frequent convergence of descriptive and injunctive norms we provided in the previous version of the paper may have been too strong, and we have therefore moderated our claims in the new revision. That said, in our studies we explicitly used a scenario in which a formal norm (a contract between the company operating the train and the passenger using its services) is violated (not buying a train ticket) that is likely endorsed and enacted by most members of a (western) society. In the revision, we have connected our claims about convergence of descriptive and injunctive norms more tightly to this specific operationalization so as not to imply that such convergence always occurs. To keep a clear focus in our paper, we decided not to elaborate further on other theoretical frameworks that address conflicting information about normative behaviors and possible discrepancies between the violation of injunctive and descriptive norms. Instead, in our discussion section we now reflect on our assumption that the participants in our study were cognizant of the norm to buy a train ticket and tended to endorse and enact this norm. The added information reads (page 24: “Third, we considered the norm violation in this study as a violation of a descriptive and injunctive legal norm. We assumed that buying a train ticket is a well-known legal norm enacted and endorsed as appropriate by most study participants. Although we did not test this assumption, the results of the manipulation checks in both studies showed that participants perceived the behavior of the norm violator to be violating of norms” and “Future research on norm violation could pay more attention to the actual endorsement and enactment of specific norms among study participants. Additionally, future research could examine situations where the violation of an injunctive norm does not constitute a violation of a descriptive norm and vice versa [43-44] to understand how participants differentially respond to violations of such more complicated normative influences”.

The authors commented that they see legal violations as a subset of the broader category of norm violations. So, it looks like this research approach suggests that violating the law also means violating social norms. To this point, please address this argument from social norm theorists:

“Different from laws, norms are socially negotiated and contextually dependent modes of conduct; laws are explicitly codified proscriptions that link violations with their corresponding punitive measures. Laws are not socially negotiated (although their enforcement might be), whereas norms and their transgressions, by definition, are negotiated through social interaction. This is an important criterion because it explains why the same mode of conduct (e.g., littering) is acceptable in one social context (littered environment) but not in another (clean environment; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). Laws and norms can certainly reinforce each other. For example, smokers may choose to refrain from lighting up in a public place for a number of reasons, including legal (fear of being penalized) or normative (fear of being accosted by someone in the vicinity), both of which lead to the same outcome (not lighting up). At other times, the two may act in opposition to each other, as when underage college students follow alcohol-drinking norms despite this behavior being illegal.” (page 394, Rimal & Lapinski, 2015)

Response: Again, thank you for your concrete input. We now address the difference between laws and norms in the Discussion section. Our text on page 24 reads as follows: “Train passengers who do not buy a train ticket transgress a legal norm and run the risk of being formally penalized by means of a fine. Note that laws, as opposed to social norms, are not negotiated through social interaction, which means that people’s responses to violating the legal norm to buy a train ticket may be relatively similar across social contexts [42]. Prior research has shown that legal norm violations such as financial fraud [5] or illegal parking [23] elicit similar responses from observers as non-legal norm violations such as arriving late to a meeting [8] or putting one’s feet on another’s table [5]”.

2. This study focuses on the association between norm violation and perception of power. The authors defined power as the perceived potential to influence others. Additionally, they suggested that the perception of someone having the capacity to do what that someone wants, it signals that the person has the capacity to influence others (perception of power; line 58-60, page 4). Following this logic, a person who does not buy a ticket is perceived as having the potential to influence others. I am still confused with this logic. How is it possible that we travel on a bus and witness a stranger not buying a ticket would make us think that that person has the potential to influence us and others? In this scenario, I might think that the person possesses some degrees of autonomy to conduct such a behavior. Yet, autonomy is conceptually different from power and does not always lead to the attribution of power. So, an inference from a high degree of autonomy to a high level of power sounds like a leap in logic. The authors cited several studies to back up this argument in their response, but the manuscript should speak for itself considering that this is a pivotal theorization in this study.

Additionally, the authors wrote that “people who violate norms demonstrate that they can behave as they wish.” How do we tell if people would attribute someone who does not buy a ticket either as the person wishes to do so or that the person has no choice at all? If the attribution is related to the second scenario, does that still mean that the person is perceived to have the capacity to influence others? This situation seems to relate to observers’ perceptions of efficacy of a norm violator as well as observers’ attributions of the norm violator's traits. Attribution theory suggests that human tends to attribute others’ negative behaviors as causally due to internal factors and with less positive traits (e.g., fundamental attribution errors). As such, a norm violator can be attributed with more negative attributes (e.g., poor, desperate) than positive attributes (e.g., rich, high self-efficacy). Isn’t it logical to think that positive attributes would be more likely to associate with higher perception of power?

Response: In order to better explain the link between norm violation and perceptions of power, we have revised the text on pages 3 and 4. The text on page 3 now reads as follows: “Social norms – implicit or explicit rules or principles that are understood by members of a group and that guide and/or constrain behavior [1] – create a shared understanding of what is acceptable within a given context and thereby contribute to the functioning of social collectives [2-4]. Accordingly, research has documented that people who violate norms tend to elicit negative responses in others, including unfavorable social perceptions [5], negative emotions [6- 8], scolding [9], gossip [10], and punishment [11-13]. Intriguingly, however, research has also demonstrated that norm violators are perceived as powerful [5], high in status [14], and influential [15]”.

The text on pages 3-5 now reads as: “By ignoring the norms that bind others, norm violators demonstrate that they can act as they wish and do not fear interference from others [5]. This is a freedom that typically comes with higher rank [19]. The influential approach/inhibition theory of power [20] states that power, which is commonly defined as asymmetrical control over valuable resources that enables influence, liberates behavior, whereas powerlessness constrains it. Indeed, ample research supports that power renders people more likely to act, even if the resulting behavior is inappropriate or harmful [21-22]. Because behavioral freedom is thus intimately associated with power, people who observe unchecked behavior of others may make inferences about others’ level of power. Indeed, people who act as they wish and disregard social norms are perceived as having high status [14], influence [15], and power [5]. Furthermore, these perceptions can, under particular circumstances, fuel actual granting of power, for instance via the conferral of control over outcomes, voting, and leadership endorsement [23-24]. In line with the notion that power liberates behavior, previous research has demonstrated that norm violators are perceived as powerful because they appear to experience the freedom to act as they please [14-15, 5] – that is, they are high on volitional capacity. In other words, norm violators are perceived as powerful because their behavior signals an underlying quality, namely the freedom to act at will. This argument resonates with costly signaling theory [25-26], which states that any seemingly costly behavior (involving large investments or risks of receiving negative outcomes) functions as a signal of an underlying characteristic [25-26]. An example of costly behavior is the reckless driving of young men as to show their strength and skills to peers and potential mates, risking serious injury or death – a type of behavior that is under particular circumstances “rewarded” with power [27]. Norm violations are potentially costly as they are frequently sanctioned [14] by means of formal (e.g., legal) punishment [28] and/or informal (social) punishment (e.g., anger, social exclusion [29-30]). According to costly signaling theory, people who engage in potentially costly norm-violating behavior signal that they possess traits that allow them not to worry about interferences from others. Because this capacity to do what one wants is typically reserved for the powerful [31], norm violators appear powerful when there are no additional cues that provide direct information about this attribute [5]”.

Thank you for your thoughts about other (than power) perceptions of norm violators. Your intuition that norm violators are generally perceived negatively is borne out by previous research, which we believe makes it all the more interesting that people still perceive norm violators as powerful – except when they are sanctioned, as we demonstrate in the current paper, because sanctioning severs the link between perceived volitional capacity and perceived power. In the introduction section on page 3, we now briefly discuss previous work that has documented negative responses to norm violations to better contextualize the current findings and enable nuanced conclusions. Your comment also led us to think about associations between perceived power and other social perceptions of norm violators more broadly, which we will seriously consider when preparing future research on responses to norm violations.

3. Operationalization of perceived power: It might be helpful to see the specific items used to measure perceived power. Right now, the manuscript says that the authors measured this construct by items like “I think this person has a great deal of power,” which does not tell if participants understood that power was about the potential ability to influence themselves and others. It would also be more informative for reviewers and readers to see the specific items measuring other scales because the items were adapted to this research situation.

Response: In the method section of Study 1, we refer to the supplementary material containing the scale items.

Perceived Power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) was measured with the following items:

1. He can get people to listen to what he says.

2. His wishes do not carry much weight. [reverse scored]

3. He can get others to do what he wants.

4. Even if he voices them, his views have little sway. [reverse scored]

5. He thinks he has a great deal of power.

6. His ideas and opinions are often ignored. [reverse scored]

7. Even when he tries, he is not able to get his way. [reverse scored]

8. If he wants to, he gets to make the decisions.

In addition, we have added one more sample item of the perceived power scale in the Method section of Study 1.

4. What has been the common context of the studies the authors cited? Were these studies mostly conducted in the western context where law and order and transportation infrastructure are to some extent more stable than that in developing countries? It is hard to fathom that a thieve on a public bus in a non-western country (norm violator) would be perceived by on-lookers as having the potential to influence others (power). It is also hard to think of an illegal drug user as being someone who has power to influence others. I wonder if there is such a line of research related to this study’s main theoretical framework to be able to be generalized with a global implication. Even in the review of Stamkou et al. (2021) that the authors cited, this norm violation – perceived power linkage was shown to have contradicting effects in India. To this point, I still see that there’s a significant challenge to persuade readers of the causal link between the observation of norm-violation behaviors and perceived power.

Response: With regard to the question of whether a thieve on a bus would be perceived as being capable of influencing others, we believe the answer is a clear yes. Interpersonal influence stems not only from admirable qualities such as competence, expertise, and skill (which are related to prestige) but also from attributes such as assertiveness, intimidation, and coercion (which are related to dominance); see, for instance, Anderson and Kilduff (2009) and Cheng et al. (2013). With regard to culture, the studies we cite were mostly conducted in a western context, consequently showing a link between norm violation and observers’ power perceptions. Stamkou et al.’s (2019) cross-cultural comparison of responses to norm violations revealed that the link between norm violation and power perceptions is positive in individualistic cultures, but negative in collectivistic cultures (Stamkou et al., 2019). Moreover, individuals in tighter cultures are less willing to endorse norm violators as leaders, compared to those in looser cultures. It is clear from this cross-cultural study that observers’ responses to norm violations are indeed influenced by the cultural context in which the violation occurs. We have addressed this issue in the final paragraph of the Discussion section on page 25.

5. The citation of perceived norm types should be acknowledged to Cialdini et al. (1990) who coined the terms, which then became widely adopted in social science.

Response: Thank you for noting this omission. We have included the reference to Cialdini et al. (1990).

6. The term “costly behavior” should be clearly defined and with an example. Perhaps, not all readers will have the in-depth knowledge of the authors’ research discipline.

Response: We have revised the text on costly behavior. The text on page 5 now reads as: “This argument resonates with costly signaling theory [25-26], which states that any seemingly costly behavior (involving large investments or risks of receiving negative outcomes) functions as a signal of an underlying characteristic [25-26]. An example of costly behavior is the reckless driving of young men as to show their strength and skills to peers and potential mates, risking serious injury or death – a type of behavior that is under particular circumstances “rewarded” with power [27].”

References not included in the paper:

Cheng, J. T., Tracy, J. L., Foulsham, T., Kingstone, A., & Henrich, J. (2013). Two ways to the top: Evidence that dominance and prestige are distinct yet viable avenues to social rank and influence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104, 103-125.

References added to the paper:

1. Cialdini RB, Trost MR. Social influence: Social norms, conformity, and compliance. In Gilbert DT, Fiske ST, Lindzey G, editors. Handbook of social psychology. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill; 1998. pp. 151–192.

2. Jetten J, Hornsey MJ. Deviance and dissent in groups. Annu Rev Psychol. 2014; 65: 461–485. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115151.

3. Tomasello M, Vaish A. Origins of human cooperation and morality. Annu Rev Psychol. 2013; 64: 231–255. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812.

6. Gutierrez R, Giner-Sorolla R. Anger, disgust, and presumption of harm as reactions to taboo-breaking behaviors. Emotion. 2007; 7(4): 853–868. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.7.4.853 853.

7. Ohbuchi KI, Tamura T, Quigley BM, Tedeschi JT, Madi N, Bond MH, Mummendey A. Anger, blame, and dimensions of perceived norm violations: Culture, gender, and relationships. J Appl Soc Psychol. 2004; 34(8): 1587–1603. doi: 10 .1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02788.x.

9. Vaish A, Missana M, Tomasello M. Three-year-old children intervene in third-party moral transgressions. Br J Dev Psychol. 2011; 29(1): 124–130. doi: 10.1348/026151010X532888.

10. Beersma B, Van Kleef GA. Why people gossip: An empirical analysis of social motives, antecedents, and consequences. J Appl Soc Psychol. 2012; 42(11): 2640–2670. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2012.00956.x.

11. Fehr E, Fischbacher U. Third-party punishment and social norms. Evol Hum Behav. 2004; 25(2): 63–87. doi: 10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4.

12. Marques JM, Abrams D, Serôdio RG. Being better by being right: Subjective group dynamics and derogation of ingroup deviants when generic norms are undermined. J Pers Soc Psychol. 2001; 81(3): 436–447. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.81.3.436.

13. Yamagishi T. The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1986; 51(1): 110–116. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110.

15. Stamkou E, Van Kleef GA, Homan AC. The art of influence: When and why deviant artists gain impact. J Pers Soc Psychol. 2018; 115(2): 276-303. doi: 10.1037/pspi0000131.

18. Tankard ME, Paluck EL. Norm perception as a vehicle for social change. Soc Iss Policy Rev. 2016; 10(1): 181-211. doi: 10.1111/sipr.12022.

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How norm violators rise and fall in the eyes of others: The role of sanctions

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How norm violators rise and fall in the eyes of others: The role of sanctions

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