What is the concept refers to the conflict among roles corresponding to two or more statuses?

Role Theory

Role theory begins with a set of normative expectations that are presumed to define particular positions or statuses in social structure and their corresponding roles or behaviors in interaction with others. The roles or statuses most clearly central here are those of ‘interviewer’ and ‘respondent’ themselves. How well one knows these roles, that is, knows the normative expectations for behavior associated with the respective roles, is a function of one's prior experience and knowledge gained either first hand or through vicarious observations – in the media, through cartoons, through conversations, or in the classroom. To be ‘trained’ as an interviewer is to learn a set of normative expectations about how one should interact with a respondent. The simplest norms are 10 of those that are ‘taken for granted’ such as who asks the questions and who gives the answers. Sometimes there are widely accepted norms defining the ideal interviewer role such as one should not reveal personal information that might thereby bias the respondent's responses (Gordon, 1975). However, even these commonplace, widely shared norms may come into question, as there may be conflict among the different goals for the interview. For example, one goal may be to get as much revelatory information as possible verses another goal to not bias the respondent's answers. The different goals of the interview (more fully revelatory data vs unbiased data) may come into conflict and suggest different contradictory norms, for example, about how much personal information the interviewer should reveal to the respondent in the interview situation.

Role theory asserts that the norms governing interaction are there for the purpose of realizing specified goals out of the interaction. In short, normative behavior is goal oriented. The norms governing the interviewer are likewise oriented to maximizing certain qualities (or values) of the data – for example, norms that call for a common stimulus to achieve validity across respondents or other norms that emphasize supportive interaction to produce full and complete responses.

A common application of role theory to the interview situation is a concern with bias introduced by other social statuses in a person's status set – the most obvious and frequently researched being the ascribed and highly visible social statuses of race, gender, and age. These statuses are often considered to be especially important when questions in the interview touch on topics closely related to them. Much research has been conducted on the effects of these statuses on interview outcomes precisely because they are considered to be master ascribed statuses that are both readily observed and ubiquitous in all interactions. They are often attributed even in telephone interviewing and not just in face-to-face situations.

One of the earliest findings of interviewer effects by race, dating to World War II, was that answers to questions about race relations were strongly impacted by the races of the interviewer and respondent (Hyman et al., 1954). African-Americans reported lower levels of satisfaction with race relations to African-American interviewers than to Caucasian interviewers. Caucasian respondents reported lower levels of acceptance of African-Americans to Caucasian interviewers than to African-American interviewers. These results have been demonstrated repeatedly since then in a study by Schuman et al. (1985) It is important to note that more limited effects of race of interviewer and respondent have been observed on studies of other topics unrelated to race.

Another interviewer status examined in some detail has been gender. Earlier research has generally shown that the gender of the interviewer has no effect on responses to survey questions except when the content of the questions relates to sexual behavior or gender-related issues (Clark, 1952; Hyman et al., 1954). Research by Kane and Macaulay (1993) found that both male and female respondents express more egalitarian gender-related attitudes or greater criticism of existing gender inequalities to female interviewers. Furthermore, male respondents offer significantly different responses to male and female interviewers on questions dealing with gender inequality.

Age, as the third of the most visible ascribed status characteristics, has also been found to have only limited interviewer effects. School-age subjects have shown different responses to older verses younger interviewers for questions about peer influences. Younger interviewers obtained slightly more peer-oriented and less adult-oriented answers than older interviewers. With respect to age of respondents, research has shown that telephone surveys tend to underrepresent older respondents, but response distributions do not vary by telephone verses face-to-face interviews across age categories (Herzog et al., 1983). As with race and gender, age appears to have little effect on interview responses except when the topic being covered is directly related to the status itself.

Roles and identities

Goffman's early works in particular are to be seen in the context of role theory, influential at the time, which he criticized and developed further. Goffman treated role analysis primarily as interaction analysis, investigating the functioning and organization of the ‘actual’ practice of performing a role against the background of its normative frame. Thus Goffman developed concepts of patterns and styles of behavior, including the term ‘role distance’ (see 1961b), which has meanwhile acquired the status of a basic sociological term and which refers to a way of behavior which comments on the role and primarily serves either the interaction system or the selves relevant in the situation. For example, Goffman described a five-year-old boy riding a roundabout horse who by little irreverences in his behavior demonstrates that his current role does not correspond to his ‘true,’ ‘more adult’ self.

In Stigma (1963), Goffman differentiated the term ‘self’ in the context of an identity theory which distinguishes three types of identity in a basic sense that is still valid at the beginning of the twenty-first century: (1) social identity as a person's role set, (2) personal identity as a person's synchronic and diachronic individuality ascribed to him by observers, and (3) ego identity as a person's inner self-reference. Goffman used these concepts of identity together with the instruments of his dramaturgical approach above all in analyzing stigmatized deviations and deviants. He focused on the techniques of information control and emotion management of the stigmatized people as well as on the consequences of the stigmatization for their identities and socialization.

The Effects of Norms

Assume that a norm has come into existence. What effects does the norm have on persons' actions? Role theory posits that norms are organized in roles that individuals take over. For example, the role of ‘father’ consists of a set of normative expectations about what a person with this role has to do and not to do. The message of the homo sociologicus is that individuals behave according to their roles (see, e.g., Biddle and Thomas, 1966). There are several problems with this proposition. One is that behavior that is not regulated cannot be explained. For example, there is no norm prescribing that one should not go to a cinema and instead watch television. A second problem is that the proposition is wrong – people often deviate from role expectations. ‘Homo sociologicus’ cannot explain such deviations. A third problem exists if there are conflicting role expectations: the theory does not tell us what expectation is heeded. The basic assumption of this theoretical orientation is that individuals are socialized into their roles and follow them blindly.

An alternative to this oversocialized conception of humans (Wrong, 1961) is to assume that in situations in which norms hold there is choice – as in any other situation. Individuals realize that they have at least two options: to follow or not to follow a norm. Each of these options has certain costs and benefits, depending on the situation. If norms are internalized, this means that breaking a norm ensues in a bad conscience, which is a cost. The severity and probability of external sanctions, including informal sanctions, are costly as well (see, e.g., Epstein, 1968; Hechter, 1984; Heckathorn, 1990; Posner and Rasmusen, 1999). But other nonnormative costs and benefits may instigate an individual to break a norm. What exactly the costs and benefits are that govern behavior if norms are given depends on the explanatory problem and cannot be specified in advance. For example, when people consider divorce, marriage norms play a more important role in Catholic than in Protestant countries. In committing murder norms may be more important than in tax evasions. In both situations, the kinds of nonnormative costs are very different. Thus, in explaining the effects of norms one has to include other nonnormative incentives and recognize that often norm following is a decision situation. This argument is based on the ‘homo oeconomicus.’ It suggests that homo sociologicus does not contradict homo oeconomicus.

To be sure, an individual has always a choice to follow a norm or break it. But often, the choice is made automatically, i.e., without thinking about the available options in a specific situation. To illustrate, let a person move to a new apartment and consider the possibilities of reaching the workplace. After weighing several alternatives, the person decides to take the subway, for the time being. It often happens that at some time a person makes a decision to act in a certain way and then performs the same action without deliberating. The action then becomes a habit – until there are certain changes in the situation (e.g., the subway schedule becomes unreliable). In regard to norms, it also happens that deviating from a norm is so costly that this action is never considered. This type of situation indeed resembles the situation that role theory seems to portray. But even if a behavior is normatively regulated, nonnormative incentives may be relatively strong so that the available options are weighed. When the effects of norms are considered, it is useful to distinguish between two types of effects. One concerns the direct effect of norms: compliance. If a norm (and the pertinent sanctions) has emerged, more people perform the behavior that is in accordance with the norm than before. If, for example, a government prohibits civil servants to smoke at their workplaces, smoking at the workplace will decrease.

This example illustrates a second type of indirect effect of norms. If fewer civil servants smoke, this may instigate others to stop smoking as well. This will reduce the number of people who get cancer and, thus, expenditures of health insurance companies will decrease. Indirect effects are often subtle and difficult to discover. For example, if companies have to pay increasing benefits to employed women (such as time off before and after pregnancy that the employer has to pay), the costs of employing women increase. The effect may be that in the long run unemployment of women increases and salaries decrease. This would certainly not have been intended by those who made the law. Increasing punishment for some crimes may amount to a higher relative benefit of committing other crimes and thus may lead to a displacement effect. In general, changing norms may change the costs or benefits of various types of actions and may thus have unanticipated and undesired indirect effects. What the indirect effects of norms are cannot be said in advance. A detailed analysis of the incentives that prevail in the situation for which the effects of norms are to be explained is necessary.

Theories/Perspectives of Work – Family Conflict

There are several theories used to explain the processes of work – family conflict. Among the most well-known is role conflict theory, which is traditionally rooted in role theory. Role theory suggests that individuals occupy a variety of roles on a daily basis. These roles may be inherently incompatible, given that they comprise various time and behavioral expectations. The clash between obligations results in what others have called ‘interrole conflict.’ Others adopted this theory in application to work – family conflict. Simply put, individuals experience work – family conflict when attempting to simultaneously occupy or engage in both types of roles (Greenhaus and Beutell, 1985; Kahn et al., 1964).

Demand-resource models have also been used to explain the antecedents and processes of work – family conflict. Demand-resource models suggest that the focal determinants of work – family conflict include the demands and resources at home and work (Bakker and Geurts, 2004; Voydanoff, 2007). For example, greater work and family demands, including job pressures, work hours, or number of children may increase work – family conflict compared to otherwise. Similarly, greater work and family resources, such as work flextime, schedule control, a supportive spouse, or paid domestic help may decrease work – family conflict (see Bellavia and Frone, 2005; Voydanoff, 2007; Young, 2011).

Other scholars further delineate work/family demands and resources as either ‘within’ or ‘between’ domain. Within-domain demands/resources are specific to work or family, respectively. Examples include generalized job pressures and in-house child care obligations. Between-domain demands/resources refer to those which can transfer and disrupt or aid demands in neighboring spheres. An example of a between-domain demand might be contact from supervisors at home. Alternatively, a between-domain resource could be job flexibility, because it provides individuals the temporal and spatial ability to simultaneously engage in work and family activities (i.e., taking work home; multitasking). Thus, while within-domain demands might reduce the time available for opposite domain-expectations, between-domain demands/resources might increase the extent to which work and family obligations interact (Voydanoff, 2007).

The distinction of within and between-domain demands/resources relates to a third, more recent perspective of work – family conflict processes: border/boundary theories. Border/boundary theories try to isolate the conditions that lead to the blurring of boundaries between work and family domains (Clark, 2000; Nippert-Eng, 1996). From this perspective, work and family obligations are not always incompatible and at times may overlap or blur, complicating work – family interactions. This theory focuses on the continuum of overlap between work and family – ranging from total segmentation to full integration of spheres. Figure 2 presents a visual representation of this idea, as outlined by Clark's (2000) version of Border Theory. The greater the integration, the greater the work – family conflict experienced.

To help explain these processes, border/boundary theories draw upon terms of flexibility and permeability. ‘Flexibility’ refers to the degree that an individual's work responsibilities can be completed outside the expected spatial and temporal parameters of the workplace. In other words, flexibility refers to “the extent to which a border may contract or expand, depending on the demands of one domain or the other” (Clark, 2000: p. 757). Likewise, ‘permeability’ entails “the degree to which a role allows one to be physically located in the role's domain but psychologically and/or behaviorally involved in another role” (Ashforth et al., 2000: p. 474).

It may be that permeability and flexibility help facilitate transitions between roles. However, they may also weaken the work – family boundary and influence role-blurring activities like multitasking on work and family activities, or working at home – each of which may contribute to work – family conflict (Clark, 2000; Olson-Buchanan and Boswell, 2006). Scholars refer to this as the role-blurring hypothesis, which predicts additional role-blurring activities, and therefore greater work – family conflict among those who experience greater integration, and whose work – family border is more flexible and permeable (Schieman and Young, 2010).

A final perspective of work – family conflict borrows from mental health scholarship in order to conceptualize work – family conflict as a chronic stressor, defined within the Stress Process Model (Pearlin et al., 1981). This perspective establishes a link between the experience of work – family conflict and the idea that it is embedded in broader social origins, including social statuses, biography, and social contexts (such as the neighborhood, workplace, etc.). These contexts affect the meaning of the stressor to the individual. Chronic stressors are also unique in that, by definition, they have dual objectives and subjective elements (Wheaton, 1999); whether or not there is an objective basis for the stressor, the “perception of it operates as a stressor” (Wheaton, 1997: p. 60). In the case of work – family conflict, the antecedents and consequences of perceived versus actual conflict between work and family differ. Objective influences, like work hours or child obligations, may lead to specific instances of time-related conflict. Yet, the social roles individuals assume and the immediate context in which they find themselves may influence whether they perceive these situations as conflictual and problematic. From this view, the subjective component of work – family conflict and its consequences may be sensitive to alternate antecedents, such as the social and psychological context in which one finds themselves (Young and Wheaton, 2013: p. 482).

The Sociology of Conflict II

Whereas Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society pertained to macrosociology, Dahrendorf's famous Homo sociologicus referred to the microlevel of role analysis. His second classic again was a confrontation with structural-functionalism because role theory became a fashionable approach particularly able to demonstrate the systemic, i.e., societal character of the individual conduct of life. Dahrendorf noted that economics created the concept of ‘homo oeconomicus’ and psychology the concept of ‘psychological man’ for their theoretical models, whereas structural-functional systems theory put forward the notion of a ‘homo sociologicus.’ According to him, this ‘sociological man’ is nothing but his role-repertoire. The category of role, a concept lent from the world of theater, seems ideal to pinpoint to the crosscutting of individual and society. Where individual and society meet, a role is created.

Interestingly enough and ironic though, Dahrendorf gave such a convincing exposition of this approach that the reception of his book in Germany took Dahrendorf as an ardent proponent of role theory. The contrary was the case. Homo sociologicus was written as a serious warning against the totalitarian underpinnings of this approach. If a human being is understood exclusively in terms of his or her role-complex, the dimensions of freedom and individuality get lost. Dahrendorf followed Simmel in that human beings are doubly constituted – as an individual being and as a social being. In Simmel's eyes, we stand with one foot in society, with the other outside of its realm. Otherwise, freedom and individuality would not be possible. Dahrendorf conceptualized the pragmatic paradox of a double human being and showed that role theory captured only one side of this duality: the social one. He demonstrated this one-sidedness in his paradigmatic example of ‘Lehrer Dr Hans Schmidt’ (‘teacher Dr Jack Smith’). Jack Smith plays many parts: man, father, husband, academic, teacher, and so on. In his behavior, he tries to ‘function’ well because he fulfills all of these roles as best as possible. Roles are conceptualized as expectations with different degrees of bindingness: ‘Must’ expectations, which are legally binding; ‘Should’ expectations, which are morally binding; and ‘Can’ expectations, which are a courtesy. Socially formed roles seem to define a burden on the shoulder of the individual who longs to be free. Dahrendorf talked about ‘die ärgerliche Tatsache der Gesellschaft’ – ‘the annoying fact of society’ in order to mark this burden. Though roles conceptualize the crosscutting point of individual and society, there seems to prevail an antagonistic view of individual and society: Society spells constraint, individuality promises freedom. It is in the phrasing of Isaiah Berlin, negative freedom or the ‘freedom of’ society, which both liberal thinkers seem to articulate. Yet, as we will see, this image was corrected by later writings of Dahrendorf in favor of conceptualizations of ‘freedom in’ society.

Since Dahrendorf was influenced by Simmel in his understanding of the interaction between individual and society, he made out conflicting role-obligations as a potential avenue for the liberty of the person. Dr Smith might deliberately miss out on some of his family obligations by overstressing his professional role as a teacher. In this sense, the diligent management of conflicting role-obligations opens up a space for freedom. In Simmel's eyes, this mechanism, the ‘crosscutting of social circles’ with the result of a conflicting role-repertoire, formed the seedbed of individual freedom. But already Simmel conceded that this liberty amounts just to a ‘freedom of’ without specifying the ‘freedom for’ a particular style of life. Yet, again, in this microsociological setting of his sociology of conflict, Dahrendorf stressed the role of freedom and the place of and for individuality in a modern liberal society. He ardently defended the modern person against the encroaching impositions of an ever more demanding society which wants to subdue its members.

American Structural–Functional Sociology

During the 1950s and 1960s, American sociology was dominated by an approach generally labeled as ‘structural-functionalist,’ or (retrospectively) to use Mullins's (1973) term as ‘Standard American Sociology’ (SAS). To a considerable extent, this involved a translation of British structural–functional anthropology into the then-contemporary and larger scale American context. Although the functional mode of explanation (in terms of consequences, especially for environing social systems) continued, as with its anthropological predecessor, the inherent teleology has been later resisted, although functional analyses can still be seen as a useful heuristic approach for generating hypotheses.

There was a strong and consistent attention to the analysis of social structure through concepts such as ‘role theory’ and ‘social system’ and others. Another path lays in the development of research tools more appropriate to the investigation of the structures of large-scale societies, especially large-scale surveys. Theoretical and methodological advances often benefited each other. A range of standard social background variables was deployed in surveys, which were useful in predicting patterns of behaviors or attitudes. As Merton (1949) pointed out, these social background variables reflected the main social statuses which people might occupy.

While much of this sociology retained a strong interest in characteristics of individuals (or patterns among various of the properties of individuals) which the survey research methodology made possible, surveys were also employed to study the ‘emergent’ or ‘structural’ characteristics of various types of social unit such as groups, households/families, organizations, suburbs, regions, and nations. As well, considerable theoretical and methodological knowledge accumulated about how relations between individuals and various types of social entities might best be studied and explained. A useful example is the Lazarsfeld typology of the different types of individual and collective properties, in which individuals can influence other individuals or collectivities and in turn collectivities can shape individuals or other collectivities.

At a more macrosociological level, analyses of which social dimensions (social cleavages) were more salient in describing patterns of societal development and operation. For example, societies with cross-cutting cleavages were more likely not to be crippled by major conflicts since the widespread sharing of interests held in common by ‘parties,’ which stood in different positions in relation to a dispute, is likely to dampen its socially destructive effect. Comparative historical sociologists studied questions such as the degree of support for left-wing political movements, finding their explanations in terms of other features of the social structure: for example, lack of socialist development in USA was seen as flowing from the (supposedly) quite open-ended texture of the American social structure, and especially the possibility that upward mobility might be achieved by all.

The ‘human ecology’ aspects of the 1920s Chicago school of sociology were formalized by Duncan and Schnore into a ‘POET’ framework, which analyzed the interrelations among Population, Organization, Environment, and Technology (see also Hawley, 1986). This schema usefully pointed to the natural environment context of social structures and some of the key elements which shaped their long-term operations.

Role theory was an important conceptual foundation stone. Often the concept was used generally and descriptively to indicate that social life was socially patterned. In some theoretical approaches, emphasis was laid on the way roles and their occupants were shaped by social learning and monitoring by role-others, rather than as in the ‘symbolic interactionist’ formulation in which role-occupant's orientation to their role was stressed. Panoply of role-related concepts piled up (e.g., Merton's status-and-role theory which allowed finer conceptual discriminations).

Role-Taking and Role-Making

Structural-functional and conflict theories of position and role, supported by social psychological theories of socialization and conformity, lay at the heart of mainstream sociology from the 1940s to the 1960s. During the 1960s, however, radical and forceful objections were raised against these theories . The immediate origin of the sociological concept of role had been Mead's (1927) account of taking the role of the other, and critics of the mainstream turned to Mead for support. They questioned the cultural determinism and oversocialized image of the actor who saw people as the mere puppets of structural forces, which had been espoused in many of the simpler textbook versions of role theory that had popularized its ideas. Blumer (1962: 189) reiterated the original insight that a structure of positions is simply a ‘framework inside of which action takes place.’ It is a conceptual guide for action, not an external, substantial entity or an independent coercive power.

Turner (1962) took this argument to the heart of role theory. He held that the emphasis on conformity gives only a partial view of role behavior. It stresses imitation and ignores innovation, failing to recognize that role-takers are also ‘role-makers’: that is, individuals do not simply take over roles as templates for conformist behavior but must, of necessity, improvise. The role knowledge that individuals learn during their primary and secondary socialization cannot give them precise, programmed instructions for behavior in all of the many unique and unpredictable circumstances in which they are likely to find themselves, especially when faced by role conflict. Individuals tentatively interpret and reinterpret each other's actions in the situations that they encounter, recreating their roles from the raw materials provided to them during socialization (Turner, 1962: 23). Shared knowledge of social positions sets the general conditions for action, but it does not fully determine it (Blumer, 1962: 190). The normative functionalist approach to role-taking has to be broadened into a more comprehensive account.

The fullest development of this view was that of Erving Goffman (1959, 1963), who explored the ways in which individuals actively and creatively construct the images that they present in their role behavior. Goffman systematically employed the theatrical metaphor of role-playing, holding that individuals are never merely actors following a script, but are authors as well. Using such ideas as props, scenery, front stage, and back stage, Goffman showed how public performances depend on the more private situations to which individuals can withdraw. He introduced a number of novel concepts, most notably ‘role distance’ to describe the psychological distancing that actors may establish from the role expectations that they find uncomfortable or uncongenial.

Health Effects of Injustice: The Model of Effort–Reward Imbalance

‘Effort–reward imbalance’ was proposed as a stress-theoretical model of a health-adverse psychosocial work environment that is based on the notion of justice of exchange (Siegrist, 1996). Social reciprocity, a fundamental principle of transactions that are characterized by some form of utility, lies at the core of the work contract, which defines distinct obligations in exchange for rewards (money, appreciation, career opportunities (promotion, job security)). The model asserts that failed reciprocity, in terms of high effort and low reward, generates strong negative emotions and associated stress reactions with adverse long-term health consequences. Failed reciprocity occurs frequently if the workers have no alternative choice in the labor market or if they are exposed to highly competitive jobs. Moreover, people with excessive work-related motivations and attitudes are at risk of experiencing this imbalance. Although there is conceptual overlap with the analysis of distributive justice in equity theory (Adams, 1965), the model has its original focus in sociological role theory, specifically the work role, emphasizing stressful effects of threats to social status and related rewards. In addition, the model combines extrinsic (situational) and intrinsic (personal) conditions of continued (chronic) imbalance, and it provides a new explanation of the occurrence of stress-related disorders by linking the experience of failed reciprocity in core social roles to the brain reward system and related psychobiological processes (Siegrist, 2005). The model also differs from the concept of organizational justice as it is applied to social exchange beyond work-related organizational contexts; in addition it explicitly deals with interpersonal comparisons beyond the relevant ‘give’ and ‘take’ relationship.

Effort–reward imbalance at work, as measured by a standardized, psychometrically validated questionnaire (Siegrist et al., 2004), was shown to be associated with significantly elevated risks for several chronic conditions in epidemiological studies, in particular depression (Rugulies et al., 2013) and coronary heart disease, including some of its main risk factors (Greenberg, 2010; Steptoe and Kivimäki, 2012; Xu et al., 2009). Importantly, these findings result from studies in different regions of the world, thus pointing to a rather basic type of stressful human experience. This latter notion is supported by evidence demonstrating associations of failed reciprocity in other social roles (e.g., volunteering, caring, homework, close social relationships) with several health indicators (Chandola et al., 2007) (see Stress at Work).

In addition to epidemiological findings this model underwent careful testing in experimental and ‘naturalistic’ investigations. Single or combined scales measuring effort–reward imbalance at work were related to dysregulated hormonal profiles, altered cardiovascular responses, and markers of reduced immune system function (Chandola et al., 2010). Moreover, first intervention studies revealed that mental health improves following a theory-based work stress reduction program (Bourbonnais et al., 2011).

Taken together, the available evidence of research on violations of the strong principle of justice of exchange in core social roles, and specifically in the work role, documents elevated subsequent risks for several disorders, such as depression or cardiovascular disease. As social reward frustration is generally more frequent among people with lower socioeconomic status, and as these stress-related disorders follow a similar social gradient, interventions should target socioeconomically deprived group with priority. Such interventions are not restricted to the individual, group, or organizational level, but may include national labor and social policies that aim at improving justice of exchange in core areas of everyday life.

Reference Groups in the Methodology of Social Research

In order to provide an insight into how the concept helped to evolve the methodology of social research, from the abundance of studies on reference group behavior we consider only some, anticipated as combinatory cases along the axes of micro-macro- and structure-process analysis. First, the analysis of structurally induced conflicts and contradictions among multiple reference groups at microsocial level has proved to be important for conceptually developing role theory. In contrast to Merton's tendency to see conflicts as disturbing forces in need to be harmonized by mechanisms of social integration, his former student Ruth Laub Coser underlined the possibility of gaining individual autonomy, cognitive flexibility, and intellectual creativity in that process: Precisely because actors with ‘complex’ instead of ‘simple’ parochial role-sets frequently experience ambiguities among them, they develop competencies in dealing with these situations; this grants them higher individual autonomy in socially differentiated modern societies (Coser, 1975). Second, macrostructural conflicts between reference groups recently have found some attention in analyzing social inequalities at national and supranational level. Still there are lively scholarly debates whether, by increasing globalization in times of crisis, people have begun to perceive themselves as part of larger stratification systems beyond a national framework, or whether their relative estimation of material deprivation rather depends on a national context (for instance, Whelan and Maitre, 2009). Third, taking microdynamics of shifting reference groups during one's lifetime into account, it has been examined how in adolescence, norms of peers as reference groups become more important than those of parents. Conflicting expectations and standards of parents and peers frequently create cross-pressure situations for adolescents; demanding standards of parental norms sometimes are reflected in those of a peer group as well (Rosen, 1955). Fourth, the dynamic macrocase of reference groups concerns the possibility that people dissatisfied with their social situation are motivated to engage in social movements with the potential to transform their social world. Urry (1973) applied reference group analysis to the empirical case of Indonesia in the first half of the twentieth century, in order to theoretically explain why actors experience dissent, organize themselves in social movements, and develop a mass revolutionary consciousness or not. He quoted Henry D. Thoreau who once has noted: “If a man does not keep pace with his companions, perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer” (Thoreau, quoted in Urry, 1973: 17). The need for understanding that drum as well has been convincingly outlined by Urry by emphasizing symbolic interactionism's fruitfulness in exploring the reference group concept. However, some of his suggestions for reformulating reference group theory seem to come closer to a structural functionalist tradition than he might have intended.

Methodologically seen, the reference group concept played an essential role in sociologically reflecting and bridging the two-way relationship of social theory and empirical research. Merton and Kitt Rossi (1950) outlined the concept's potential for structural and functionalist sociology, also distancing it from routines of small group research dominant in much social psychology of their time. The authors have frequently emphasized the concept's importance for comparative studies on social structure and patterns of reference group behavior of like-statused individuals. While they have explored the theoretical relevance of the concept for a broader scope of sociological research, conversely, reference groups also served as part of more abstract concepts' operational definitions. In order to get a clearer prospect of how to conduct research on Parsonian concepts of universalism and particularism in people's action orientation (Parsons and Shils, 1951: 76–88), Peter M. Blau (1962) interpreted them in the language of reference groups, hence necessarily referring to attributes of social structure, in contrast to cultural norms or personal motivational standards. The ‘American Soldier’ study's tremendous influence on an evolving discipline has also been reflected in the reader Language of Social Research (Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg, 1955); it also adumbrates how the broad use of the reference group concept apparently helped to develop procedures for social research. This alludes to generating social indices such as of mobility rates, group cohesion, social differentiation, and integration for studying the bearing of variations of social contexts upon the individuals' behavior situated in that social structure (Kendall, 1955; Merton and Kitt, 1950: 81ff.). The reference group concept also clarified the interplay of objective and subjective group properties in multivariate analyses on voting (Berelson et al., 1954; Suchman and Menzel, 1955) and the analysis of change through time in processes of public opinion and attitude formation (Lazarsfeld et al., 1955). More generally, Merton has taken account of the methodological perspective from which reference groups are examined: Since reference group behavior involves two-sided social relationships, similar to a theory of influence, it required a “simultaneous analysis both of the individuals adopting various reference groups and of the groups which provide these frames of reference” (Merton, 1957: 328). The reference group concept is useful for social research, because it provides an explanation both for the structural conditions under which social groups, particularly nonmembership groups, influence a person's values, attitudes, and behavior, and for the consequences of that process within the larger social structure.

‘Status’ as a Social Process and ‘Roles’ as Stable Expectations

Bales' findings spawned another very productive line of contemporary structural-functionalist research regarding the process of status differentiation. Interested in explaining the process by which stable hierarchies could emerge even in nondifferentiated groups, such that some group members come to hold more influence over group decision making and respect than others, Joseph Berger and colleagues created expectation states theory (Berger et al., 1972). The development of this new theoretical research program led the structural-functionalist line of research to move from conceptualizing status as set positions per se, and conceive status to be more of a process where some individuals achieve more influence over others in small group interaction. Under expectation states theory, members of task-oriented groups become differentiated as the group develops consensual expectations regarding which group members are more skilled or competent at the collective task. Those whose contributions are expected to be more beneficial for helping the group achieve their goal are accorded more influence in the group, such that others in the group are more likely to defer decisions to group members who are expected to be skilled at the group task. More recent work has also found that influence or status is provided to those who are perceived to be more group oriented and willing to sacrifice personal gain for the group (Hardy and Van Vugt, 2006; Ridgeway, 1982; Willer, 2009). Not only are these ‘high status’ group members more likely to be given more opportunity to state their opinions and have their opinions evaluated highly and validated by other group members, but also they take on the behaviors of a leader, such that they are more likely to interrupt, disagree, or emit behaviors to guide the group along. The opposite is true for lower status group members, who become less likely to state their opinions and more likely to concede to the suggestion of others. Thus, under expectation states theory, roles become relegated to being stable set of complementary expectations of the skills and behaviors attributed to those accorded different positions along an intragroup status hierarchy. Under expectation states theory, expectations, or roles produce status or intragroup influence, which in turn gives rise and legitimacy to differentiated status positions.

This view of status as a dynamic process with roles as static differing expectations attached to different status positions continues to hold even among several theoretical offshoots of expectations states theory like status characteristics theory (Berger et al., 1972) and status construction theory (Ridgeway, 2001, 2006). Status characteristics theory explains how salient status characteristics, such as gender, race, or class, become stable bases of hierarchical status inequality in groups. Status construction theory focuses on explaining the development and spread of status beliefs in society. Recent work on the social psychology of status has focused on functional importance of status hierarchies in creating differential role expectations between high and low status group members. It has been found that people respond positively when they form working relationships with others who complement them in terms of dominance, such that ‘dominance complementarity’ has also led to higher levels of group cohesion (Tiedens and Fragale, 2003; Tiedens et al., 2007). Indeed, Ridgeway and Johnson (1990) found that frustration and negative emotional behaviors are more likely to be engaged in when groups are unable to come to agreement on a status order. They state: “Status struggles emerge out of task-based disagreements when the disagreeing members do not mutually agree on a resolution after an initial statement of arguments. This may … happen when two members disagree about their relative performance expectations or have nearly equal performance expectations” (p. 1203).

In recent years, work on social status and its impact on role expectations has proliferated greatly. However, an underlining theme across much recent research highlights the idea that as people are differentiated into varying status positions, the characteristics, behaviors, and even emotions attributed to these status-differentiated individuals differ in predictable ways. For example, Tiedens et al. (2000) found that high- and low-status members of groups were expected to have different emotional reactions to positive and negative group outcomes. High-status actors were expected to feel angrier when group outcomes were negative and more pride when group outcomes were positive, while lower status actors were expected to feel more sad and guilty when the group failed and more appreciation and gratitude when the group was successful. Work on the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 1999; Fiske et al., 2002; Glick and Fiske, 2001) has found that stereotypes associated with high status groups often assume members of these groups are highly competent. Even more interesting has been their finding that many stereotypes hold an inverse relationship between perceptions of competence and perceptions of warmth of different social groups, such that many groups that hold high societal social status, but whose positions threaten status quo, are considered competent, but not warm (e.g., business women or rich people). Indeed, work on real-world status differences has found that those who hold higher social positions, such as those with more resources, are less likely to act in prosocial manner (Piff et al., 2010), more likely to violate norms of ethical behavior to achieve desired personal ends (Piff et al., 2012), and less likely to attribute social and personal outcomes with contextual explanations (Kraus et al., 2009).

To summarize, early structural-functional role theorists were interested in understanding how occupants of different social statuses learned to internalize, conform, and juggle the existing agreed-upon role expectations that their status positions subject them to. Over time, structural-functional research in roles and status moved toward a more dynamic picture of the process of both role and status differentiation. However, this move toward a more dynamic look at the differentiation processes between those of differing positions and status comes at the expense of understanding how undertaking role behavior itself can also be a dynamic process. Structural-functional explanations of role behavior tend to presuppose static normatively shared consensuses around the boundaries and expectations of a role and they also tend to assume that individuals engage in differential role behavior due to individual internalization of normative role expectations. The areas in which both early and contemporary functional role theorists are not strong in explaining include understanding role-based interactions, in particular: (1) how variety and change in the enactment of role behaviors can occur and (2) understanding how individuals resolve conflicting motivations when enacting or rejecting role expectations.