Sensory memory permits the temporary storage of information we receive from our senses.

III Review of Important Psychology Theories/concepts

Of these numerous fields of psychology as discussed earlier, cognitive psychology and social psychology have significantly influenced the formation of information systems subspecialties. The central component of cognitive psychology, which is the study of the human mind, is concerned with adults' normal, typical cognitive activities of knowing/perceiving/learning. Cognitive scientists view the human mind as an information processing system that receives, stores, retrieves, transforms, and transmits information (the computational or information processing view). The central hypothesis of cognitive psychology is that “thinking can best be understood in terms of representational structures in mind and computational procedures that operate on those structures.” Cognitive science originated in the mid-1950s when researchers in several fields (philosophy, psychology, AI, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology) began to develop theories of the workings of the mind—particularly knowledge, its acquisitions, storage, and use in intelligent activity.

A major concern of cognitive psychology deals with the cognitive architecture (Fig. 2), referring to information processing structure and its capacity. The cognitive architecture is comprised of three subsystems: sensory input systems (vision, hearing, taste/smell, touch), central processing systems, and output systems (motor outputs and decision and actions). The central processing systems perform a variety of activities to process information gathered from the sensory input systems. They include memory and learning, such as processing/ storing/retrieving visual (mental imagery) and auditory/ echoic information, and representing that information in memory. Other areas of central processing activities include problem solving (any goal-directed sequence of cognitive operations), reasoning, and creativity. Specifically, they include cognitive skills in problem solving; reasoning including that about probability; judgment and choice; recognizing pattern, speech sounds, words, and shapes; representing declarative and procedural knowledge; and structure and meaning of languages, including morphology and phonology.

The central processing system can be viewed for the information processing perspective as having a three-stage process:

Sensory memory can be characterized by large capacity, very short duration of storage, and direct association of with sensory processes. The initial attention process selects information for further processing.

Short-term memory (also known as working memory) has limited capacity where information selected from sensory memory is linked with information retrieved from long-term memory (past experiences and world knowledge) that forms the basis for our actions/behavior.

Long-term memory is characterized by large capacity, long duration. Our episodic (every day experiences) and semantic (world knowledge) information is stored in the long-term memory. Much of the research dealing with connective models, such as neural nets, focus on the structure of this long-term memory, although some researchers also expand the neural net perspective to include sensory and short-term memory. Topics such as language, concept formation, problem solving, reasoning, creativity, and decision making are usually associated with the structure and processes of this long-term memory. Also, the issue of “experts” versus “novices” is almost always linked with the structure of secondary memory.

Perhaps, behavioral decision theory may be the most influential theory developed by cognitive scientists that has contributed toward the developments of DSS research subspecialities. Behavioral decision theory is concerned with normative and descriptive decision theories. The normative decision theory aims at “prescribing courses of action that conform most closely to the decision maker's beliefs and values.” Behavioral decision theorists proposed decision theories solely on the basis of behavioral evidence, without presenting neurological internal constructs on which to base these mechanisms. Descriptive decision theory aims at “describing these beliefs and values and the manner in which individuals incorporate them into their decisions.” Descriptive decision theories have focused on three main areas of studies: judgment, inference, and choice. The study of judgment, inference, and choice has been one of the most important areas of cognitive psychology research, which has been referenced most frequently by DSS researchers.

2.2 Memory Networks

We could not survive without memory. When we receive information from the environment, our sensory system stores it naturally (sensory memory) and then forms short-term memory, which is the temporary storage of small amounts of information. Subsequently, long-term memory (explicit and implicit memory) is created that reflects our capacity to store information over long periods of time and communicate with others and the outside world. In general, the memory process involves three stages—encoding, storage, and retrieval—and each recruits different brain networks. For example, when information comes into our sensory memory, it often needs three systems to encode information: visual (picture), acoustic (sound), and semantic (meaning). Moreover, simply receiving information is not sufficient to encode it, and we must also attend to and process it. As a result, encoding requires both automatic and effortful processing. Clearly, the encoding process requires the interaction between attention and memory networks. In the same vein, storage and retrieval processes also work with the encoding process to form memory. For instance, the need to maintain information in the face of distraction and the need to retrieve information that could not be maintained, both functions involve memory process, but different attention control is required based on task demands. It should be noted that there are individual differences in memory and attention capacities associated with higher-order cognitive processes such as intelligence and decision-making (Cowan, 2016; Ekman, Fiebach, Melzer, Tittgemeyer, & Derrfuss, 2016). Previous studies have suggested that the memory process of encoding, storage, and retrieval mainly involves the medial temporal lobe (MTL)—hippocampus, parietal cortex, amygdala, and other brain areas (Takeuchi et al., 2010). Mindfulness training significantly improves memory performance as shown by a series of studies, along with attention and self-control improvements following mindfulness, as well as more efficient networks of attention, memory, and self-control, which could all improve learning and teaching outcomes in the education system (Tang et al., 2015).

Sensory and Short-Term Memory

The greatest challenge to the claim in the previous paragraph, that all remembering is reconstructive, may come from studies of sensory memory, defined as the borderline between perceiving and remembering. Many theorists have argued that perceiving is itself a constructive activity, with the fascinating phenomena of visual and auditory illusions used as evidence for this claim (see Hoffman, 1998; among many others). Sensory memory refers to the temporary persistence of information that has struck the senses, which lingers briefly as it is being comprehended. Visual persistence is called iconic memory and auditory persistence is labeled echoic memory. It would seem that iconic memory – essentially a fleeting afterimage of the scene from the outside world – would surely be a form of reproductive memory. Yet even in these situations errors arise, showing that the retrieval processes from this type of memory involve reconstruction. For example, in Sperling's (1967) studies of iconic memory, in which people had to report letters that they had briefly seen on a screen, a common error when people missed a letter was to report another letter that either looked like or sounded like the original letter. This type of error indicates that people may code even such simple items as single letters into visual patterns and associated sounds. When people miss a b in these experiments, they may substitute a v (which sounds like b) or a p or d, which share both similar appearance (a long line and a curve) and similar sound (the letters rhyme with b). In sum, even reports from iconic memory may show reconstructive tendencies.

Short-term and working memories last longer than sensory memories do, but people are still ordinarily accurate in retrieving information from short-term stores if no interference occurs. Does this accuracy reflect a rote, reproductive process? The answer seems to be no, because when the short-term memory system is challenged by having people operate under, for example, fast rates of presentation, errors occur. Errors are often (but not always) phonological in nature. That is, if someone tries to recall letter strings and misses a letter, similar sounding letters are confused (Conrad, 1964). In the case of words, those that share visual and phonemic (sound-based) features are confused (Crowder, 1976; Chapter 4). Therefore, even though short-term memory processes are often considered quite accurate (and they can be), recall in these situations typically occurs under conditions that make for accurate reconstructions (e.g., with short unfilled delays between study and test). Stress these systems by presenting material quickly, or by creating interference, and the characteristic error pattern indicative of a reconstructive process appears.

2.2.3 Corpus Callosum

The corpus callosum (CC) is the most prominent white matter structure, comprising approximately 200 million axons connecting equivalent regions of the two cerebral hemispheres. The CC integrates sensory, memory storage and retrieval, attention and arousal, language, and auditory functions (Giedd, 2008; Lenroot & Giedd, 2006). The CC is among the last of the brain's structures to complete maturation, undergoing rapid growth before and during puberty and lasting through adolescence until the mid-20s (Barnea-Goraly et al., 2005; Giedd et al., 1999). CC signal intensity decreases between ages 7 and 32 years, with the most rapid changes during childhood, stabilizing in early adulthood as cerebral functioning becomes more lateralized (Keshavan et al., 2002). The number of connections increases during adolescence, and CC fibers are important in connecting motor and sensory cortices so that increased white matter in this location may be associated with improved motor skills during development (Barnea-Goraly et al., 2005) and in adulthood (Johansen-Berg, Della-Maggiore, Behrens, Smith, & Paus, 2007), such as are required for skilled driving performance.

The CC influences handedness—whether an individual has a strong preference (usually for right-handedness) or is “mixed-handed.” Wolman (2005) reported that rather than left-handers being more prone to have vehicle crashes, as was once thought, it is mixed-handers who are more at risk. Consistent with an interhemispheric model would be the enhanced risk of someone talking on a cell phone (a predominantly left-hemisphere task involving language) while driving with the left hand (a predominantly right-hemisphere task for the motor performance component). Further neuroscience evidence is required on potential compromises to the driving task of “cross-talk” between the brain hemispheres that could result from engaging in various secondary tasks during driving.

Spatialising concepts

In Conceptual Spaces, Gardenfors (2000) develops a theory of conceptual representation in the cognitive science tradition developed by Rosch, Lakoff and others (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Medin 1989; Rosch 1975), surveyed earlier in Chapter 3, ‘The meaning of meaning’. Gardenfors develops a ‘conceptual framework’, a constellation of concepts in which ‘concept’ itself figures prominently. In the first part of the book, Gardenfors presents a framework comprising:

Conceptual spaces—A high level collection of concepts and relations, used for organising and comparing sensory, memory or imaginative experiences.

Domains—A clustering of related concepts. Gardenfors (2000) suggests ‘spatial’, ‘colors’, ‘kinship’ and ‘sounds’ are possible concept domains.

Quality dimensions—Generalised distinctions which determine the kinds of domains concepts belong to, such as ‘temperature’, ‘weight’, ‘height’, ‘width’ and ‘depth’. Gardenfors states: ‘The primary function of the quality dimensions is to represent various “qualities” of objects’, and, more specifically, that they can be ‘used to assign properties to objects and to specify relations among them’ (Gardenfors 2000, p. 6). Dimensions can be either phenomenal (relating to direct experience) or scientific (relating to theorisations of experience); innate or culturally acquired; sensory or abstract.

Representations—Gardenfors discriminates between three layers of representation: the symbolic (or linguistic), the sub-conceptual (or connectionist) and the conceptual, which Gardenfors claims mediates between the other two layers. Each layer—from sub-conceptual through to symbolic—exhibits increasing degrees of granularity and abstraction of representation. Gardenfors also notes that the conceptual mediates between the parallel processing of sub-conceptual neural networks and serial processing involved in the production and interpretation of symbolic language.

Properties—’These are means ‘for “reifying” the invariances in our perceptions that correspond to assigning properties to the perceived objects’ (Gardenfors 2000, p. 59). They are specialised kinds of concepts which occupy a ‘region’ within a single domain, delineated within the broader conceptual space by quality dimensions. A feature of properties defined in this way is that they accord both with strict and vague or fuzzy borders between properties—objects can be permitted ‘degree[s] of membership’, depending on their proximity to the centre of the property region. Both classical and prototypical theories of classification can be accommodated.

Concepts—General (non-propertied) concepts differ from properties in that they can belong to multiple domains, and different conceptual features can gain greater salience in different contexts. Concepts are in a constant process of being added, edited and deleted within new domain arrangements; consequently, concept meaning is transient. Conceptual similarity comes on the basis of shared or overlapping domains.

The resulting framework is pragmatic and ‘instrumentalist’; the ‘ontological status’ of conceptual spaces is less relevant than that ‘we can do things with them’ (Gardenfors 2000, p. 31). Specifically, the framework ought to have ‘testable empirical consequences’ and, further, to provide a useful knowledge representation model for ‘constructing artificial systems’ (Gardenfors 2000, p. 31). One advantage of the use of geometric metaphors to describe conceptual arrangements is that it is possible to calculate approximate quantifications of semantic distance between individual concepts and concept clusters. However, the mathematisation of conceptual structures is to be taken as a heuristic rather than deterministic model—for Gardenfors, ‘we constantly learn new concepts and adjust old ones in the light of new experiences’ (Gardenfors 2000, p. 102). In light of this ever-changing configuration of concepts, any calculation of semantic proximity or distance is likely to be at best accurate at a point in time, although statistically—across time and users of conceptual clusters and relations—there may well be computable aggregate tendencies.

The arrangement of concepts and properties within conceptual spaces and domains depends on a coordinating principle of similarity:

First, a property is something that objects can have in common. If two objects both have a particular property, they are similar in some respect… Second, for many properties, there are empirical tests to decide whether it is present in an object or not. In particular, we can often perceive that an object has a specific property or not (Gardenfors 2000, pp. 60–61).

Dimensions form the basis against which similarity is assessed—a single dimension for properties, multiple dimensions for concepts. Conceptual similarity for Gardenfors is intrinsically a cognitive and theoretical notion, however, which can consequently be varied as different dimensional properties are found to be more or less salient:

For example, folk botany may classify plants according to the color or shape of the flowers and leaves, but after Linnaeus the number of pistils and stamens became the most important dimensions for botanical categorizations. And these dimensions are perceptually much less salient than the color or shape domains. Shifts of attention to other domains thus also involve a shift in overall similarity judgments (Gardenfors 2000, p. 108).

In the latter part of the book, Gardenfors then shows how his framework can be applied to traditional problems of semantics, induction and computational knowledge representation and reasoning (Gardenfors 2000). In particular he emphasises the relationship of conceptual structures to broader spheres of human action and practice. In what is an avowedly ‘pragmatist account’, meaning is put to the service of use within these spheres—though it is not equivalent to it. Unlike conventional semantics, the kind of ‘conceptual semantics’ Gardenfors espouses works down from social practice to fine-grained linguistics utterances: ‘actions are seen as the most basic entities; pragmatics consists of the rules for linguistic actions; semantics is conventionalized pragmatics… and finally syntax adds markers to help disambiguate when the context does not suffice’ (Gardenfors 2000, p. 185).

The pragmatist elements of this account fits well with the analysis of language Brandom undertakes, while the social orientation begins to bring concepts out of mind and language and into the intersubjective domain theorised by Habermas—points of accord succinctly encapsulated in the following quote: ‘In brief, I claim that there is no linguistic meaning that cannot be described by cognitive structures together with sociolinguistic power structures’ (Gardenfors 2000, p. 201). Applied to knowledge systems, Gardenfors supplies a convenient ‘first tier’ description of the kind of entity which includes the explicit conceptualisation of the system itself, and the tacit commitments which stand behind it. ‘Conceptual spaces’, standing here for Quine’s ‘conceptual schemes’, are mentalist metaphors for describing at least part of what it is that a knowledge system represents. The remaining sections add further descriptive tiers on which the framework of the study can be mounted.

The role of memory and contested history in cultural heritage

As was found with cultural heritage, the notions of memory and contested history have not been discussed much in the field of library science, whereas the literature in museum studies and archival science is filled with discourse on these aspects. While for decades museums and archives have been grappling with the impact that memory and contested history have in shaping cultural heritage, libraries have generally overlooked these conceptual aspects in their pursuit of digitizing cultural heritage. And yet, it is impossible to consider what constitutes cultural heritage without taking these factors into account.

This section gives a very brief overview of the concepts of memory and contested history, before a more in-depth exploration is undertaken from the differing perspectives and approaches of museums, archives and libraries.

Cultural heritage, in its broad sense (in other words, not only addressing the aspect of documentary cultural heritage as defined by UNESCO), carries with it the implicit, and problematic, notion of memory. It is people’s memories, both individual and shared, that shape the formation of cultural heritage. It could be argued that scientific scholarship should be excluded from this discussion on memory. However, in terms of indigenous knowledge systems, scientific knowledge is passed down through the generations orally, and thus is also affected by the element of memory.

Therefore, it would be useful to be cognisant of some of the features of memory which are applicable within this context. In her study on how memory functions and how it contributes to the shaping of heritage, using the specific case of Chief Albert Luthuli, Menhert outlined some core factors to be considered. She noted that memory is comprised of several parts, and that it can be rigid and unable to be changed, or it can be fluid and, upon influence, be changed. She noted the three types of memory to be sensory memory (memory that can be evoked by a cue from one of the senses, such as a smell, a sight, a sound), short-term memory (which lasts for approximately 20 seconds, and, unless the information is integrated, can be lost), and long-term memory (which is the aspect of memory that is relevant to heritage) (Menhert, 2011: 1–2).

Menhert described the three components of long-term memory. The procedural component relates to processes we learn in order to perform tasks, such as how to drive a car, and these, once integrated, can be used automatically. Declarative memory could be considered to be memory by rote, where, for example, names, dates and multiplication tables are integrated into the mind and are able to be reproduced by rote. The third component is the one that concerns archival memory, and is termed “episodic memory.” Episodic memory remembers events and how they affect us personally (ibid.: 2). Menhert noted that along with considering memory, it is also important to understand the role of forgetting, and how it occurs. Forgetting can occur when there is a lack of a retrieval cue to trigger the memory. Most critically, Menhert noted that when conducting interviews to record oral history, great care should be taken not to inadvertently plant memories by means of suggestion, thus altering the memories of the individuals (ibid.: 3). She also observed that people can trigger memories in each other when they collectively experience a shared event. Menhert concluded that the memories that people have are as much an intrinsic part of history and cultural heritage knowledge as are documents, books and photographs. The primary source documents can only reveal a certain amount of information, but the context can be amplified and supplemented by relating the memories of people to them. Conflicts and differences in memory are enrichments to the narrative, and should be explored further in dialogs. In the museum context, where for example exhibitions display objects to tell a story, she posited that the process of how the exhibition was mounted, what was chosen, and why, as well as the inclusion of memories from people, give the public an awareness of how important and complex memories are, and adds an essential dimension to enable deeper research and understanding. Memory formed under trauma, which is especially prevalent in South Africa with its recent history of apartheid, is worthy of deeper and focused exploration in order to also bring to the surface what may have been forgotten (ibid.: 9–11).

Menhert’s findings from the perspective of museums are reinforced by perspectives from the field of archives. Harris, in considering the case of the archive of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, noted that the domain of social memory was the foremost location of struggle, and that this struggle was defined by the struggle of remembering against forgetting. He outlined that forgetting was an essential element in the struggle against apartheid, as some memories were too painful to remember. He further noted that memory is not a true reflection of reality and process, and that it is shaped by imagination. In South Africa’s social memory, it is a battle of narrative against narrative. Harris described how the tools of forgetting were a crucial element in the arsenal of apartheid South Africa’s state power, and that the state destroyed public records and removed voices they did not wish to hear by means of harassment, censorship, banning, detention without trial and assassination. He observed that even in the transition to democracy, the apartheid state sanitized and destroyed memory it did not wish to transfer to the future democratic government (Harris, 2007: 289–90). This example illustrates how the already challenging notion of the accuracy of memory is compounded exponentially in a context like South Africa.

In a different approach to Menhert, Jimerson identified four categories of memory. He described them as personal, collective, historical and archival (Jimerson, 2003: 89). Expanding further, he observed that collective memory as social memory is seldom subject to examination for reliability, authenticity and validity. He also observed that personal memory as eyewitness testimony is subject to the fact that memory can change over time, and that archival memory contains collections of surrogates of captured memory frozen in time. Jimerson considered that historical memory functions best as evidence-based examinations of artifacts, documents and personal testimony (ibid.: 89–90).

With this background on the role of memory in shaping perceptions and interpretations of what happened in history, it can be explicitly assumed that as a result history is often contested. Dubin referred to the “culture wars” which encompassed deeply felt confrontations between different groups within a society over interpretations of race and ethnicity, the body, sexuality, identity politics, religion, national identity and patriotism (Dubin, 2006: 477). In the context of history, he posited that these contests were shaped by social and political changes both within a nation and globally (ibid.: 478).

The factor of contested history when considering cultural heritage, and especially when deciding how to collect, describe, preserve, showcase and present documentary cultural heritage, is a fundamental element to be recognized. If a program of information literacy intends to present questions and exercises that will guide users to cultural heritage resources, it is essential that the program is cognisant of this, and of the fact that collections may be biased in favor of, for example, a former colonial power’s viewpoint reflecting a distorted version of a particular cultural group, or that collections may exclude the views of minorities living in developed countries.

Following this brief overview of the critical role that memory and contested history play in the shaping of cultural heritage, it is now necessary to explore the broader approaches and perspectives of museums, archives and libraries.

The Growth of Cognitive Psychology

The 1960s brought progress in many of the above-mentioned topic areas, some of which are highlighted below.

The New Psycholinguistics

Beginning in the early 1960s there was great interest in determining the psychological reality of Chomsky's theories of language (these theories had been formulated with ideal listeners and speakers in mind). Some of these linguistically inspired experiments presented sentences in perception and memory paradigms, and showed that sentences deemed more syntactically complex by transformational grammar were harder to perceive or store (Miller, 1962). Subtler experiments tried to show that syntactic units, like phrases, functioned as units in perception, STM, and LTM (Fodor et al. (1974) is the classic review). While many of these results are no longer seen as critical, this research effort created a new subfield of cognitive psychology, a psycholinguistics that demanded sophistication in modern linguistic theory.

Not all psycholinguistic studies focused on syntax. Some dealt with semantics, particularly the representation of the meanings of words, and a few of these studies made use of the newly developed mental chronometry. One experiment that proved seminal was reported by Collins and Quillian (1969). Articipants were asked simple questions about the meaning of a word, such as ‘Is a robin a bird,’ and ‘Is a robin an animal?’; the greater the categorical difference between the two terms in a question, the longer it took to answer. These results were taken to support a model of semantic knowledge in which meanings were organized in a hierarchical network, e.g., the concept ‘robin’ is directly connected to the concept ‘bird,’ which in turn is directly connected to the concept ‘animal,’ and information can flow from ‘robin’ to ‘animal’ only by going through ‘bird’ (see the top of Figure 1). Models like this were to proliferate in the next stage of cognitive psychology.

Figure 1. (a) Part of a Collins, A.M., Quillian, R.M., 1969. Retrieval time from semantic memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 8, 240–247 semantic network. Circles designate concepts and lines (arrows) between circles designate relations between concepts. There are two kinds of relations: subset-superset (‘Robin is a bird’) and property (e.g., ‘Robins can fly’). The network is strictly hierarchical, as properties are stored only at the highest level at which they apply. (b) Part of an Anderson, J.R., Bower, G.H., 1973. Human Associative Memory. Winston, Washington, DC propositional network. Circles represent concepts and lines between them labeled relations. All propositions have a subject-predicate structure, and the network is not strictly hierarchical. (c) Part of a simplified connectionist network. Circles represent concepts, or parts of concepts, lines with arrowheads depict excitatory connections, and lines with filled circles designate inhibitory connections; typically numbers are put on the lines indicate the strength of the connections. The network is not strictly hierarchical, and is more interconnected than the preceding networks.