Which virtue does philippa foot identify as benefiting community rather than self?

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                                              PHILLIPA FOOT:  VIRTUE ETHICS

"Morality is internal.  The moral law. . . has to be expressed in the form, 'be this,' not in the form  'do this.' . . . The true moral law says 'hate not,' instead of 'kill not.' . . . The only mode of stating the moral law must be as a rule of character."

--Leslie Stephen, The Science of Ethics

Traditional philosophy has misinterpreted Greek ethics as a moral rationalism and objectivism.  There is no ethics of duty or obligation there, but only an ethics of virtue.

One of the "virtues" of virtue ethics ("virtue" in the broad sense of a "function" or "excellence") is that it offers bridges across the traditional dualisms of ethical objectivism and subjectivism, between moral rationalism and voluntarism, between the head and the heart (both are important), between intention and consequence (both have value), and between intellectual and moral virtue.  We will see that Phillipa Foot believes that wisdom is both an intellectual and a moral virtue.

The motto for virtue ethics is: "Be this sort of person" rather than "Follow this rule."  Kant's "What is my duty?" becomes instead "What sort of person shall I become?"

Foot will describe virtue ethics as the art of charting a course among various temptations, those dispositions of a lower order.  The navigation tools are the virtues, "corrective" dispositions to those which lead us astray.

A definition of virtue: "The virtues are sentiments, that is, related families of dispositions, and properties regulated by a higher-order desire. . . .--John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 

J. S. Mill's criticism of a duty-based morality in Christianity: "Christian morality (so-called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is, in great part, a protest against paganism [viz., Greek ethics].  Its ideal is negative rather than positive, passive rather than active; innocence rather than nobleness; abstinence from evil, rather than energetic pursuit of the good; in its precepts 'Thou shalt not' predominates unduly over 'Thou shalt.'  Whatever exists of magnanimity, highmindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honor, is derived from the purely human, not the religious part of our education, and never could have grown out of a standard of ethics in which the only worth, professedly recognized, is that of obedience" (On Liberty [Penguin ed.], p. 112.)

PROBLEMS WITH A DUTY-BASED ETHIC

(First two focuses on duty ethics which have a theological basis, and the last two deal with Kant.)

The Problem of Ethical Motivation.  In its religious form, the sanctions of a duty-based ethics are primarily external: rewards for those who do good and punishment for those who do evil.  This leads to mere moralism rather than a genuine morality based on internal sanctions and the view, drawn from the Greeks, that virtue is its own reward.  Only the latter is an acceptable form of ethical motivation.  Only Kant escapes this criticism, but only to end up facing even more serious problems.

The Problem of Legalism.  True morality should be the foundation of law, and virtue should precede moral rule.  In fact, moral rules are abstractions from the practice of virtue.  A duty-based ethics reverses this order.  It speaks of law, usually divine law, first, and moral rules comes directly from the mouth and mind of the lawgiver.  True morality should always serve as a check for the possibility of unjust laws.  If law and morality are the same, then this crucial idea of morality as the guardian of law is undermined.  The example of Job and Divine Command Morality.  The example of Huck Finn and his refusal to turn in the slave boy Jim.

The Problem of Character.  Kant's duty-based morality generates counter-intuitive claims about the value of character, motivation, and inclination in performing moral actions.  See the example of Jack and Jill and embezzling money from their bank later in the chapter.

Overemphasis on Rational Autonomy.  Kant's ethics is overly atomistic and places impossible demands on the individual.  The atomistic individual is in fact an abstraction from the community at large.  In deemphasizing Kant's rational autonomy, virtue ethicists also bridge the gap between reason and the passions.  They deal with the whole person as s/he is situated in society.

 ENABLING VS. SUBSTANTIVE VIRTUES

Philosophers have generally distinguished between two types of virtues: "enabling" virtues and the "substantive" virtues. The substantive virtues have moral content or "substance," i.e., the right desire to tell the truth or help the needy, whereas the enabling virtues simply help us resist one temptation or another.  The substantive virtues require proper motivation towards the good, while the enabling virtues require sufficient will power to counter evil.

One psychological test by which one can distinguish the two is Aristotle's requirement that one must take pleasure in the virtues.  Another criterion is that the enabling virtues are not done for their own sake, but for the sake of the substantive virtues.

Let us do the virtue of nonviolence as an example.  It seems that nonviolence should be classified as an enabling virtue.  We all need a nonviolent disposition if we are to overcome desires to injure, retaliate, and to verbally abuse.  This virtue are obviously part of the will to resist rather than a direct desire for the good.  Using the tests above, we can see that a nonviolent thief is not only possible but also probably the most successful.  Using Aristotle's test of taking pleasure in virtue, we see that this is not required of nonviolent action.  Resisting the temptation to retaliate while enduring the attacks of an aggressor would obviously not be a pleasant activity. 

As an exercise determine the type of each of these virtues:

pride

rationality

honesty

loyalty

optimism

benevolence

self-control

charity

nonviolence

fairness

kindness

courage

resoluteness

industry

sympathy

patience

compassion

conscientiousness

endurance

foresight

gratitude

fortitude

FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES

(From the Greeks)

wisdom

courage

justice

temperance

THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES

faith

hope

charity

humility

piety

THEOLOGICAL VICES

(seven deadly sins)

lust

sloth

greed

envy

pride

jealousy

spite

FOOT VS. ARISTOTLE ON WISDOM

1.  Foot believes that wisdom is both an intellectual and a moral virtue; it is both a state of mind and a determination of character.  It deals with both knowing something and willing something.  A person might know what the proper goals of life are, and may even know the means to achieve these goals, but this same person may lack the will to do anything about them.

2.  Foot believes that, contrary to Aristotle, wisdom is achievable by any person who wants it?  Note two important qualifiers to this claim: (1) only persons can be wise; (2) and one must be able to form a desire to be wise.  Also the cognitive elements as stated above must be conscious in the mind.  What do you think of Foot's claim?  What about Charlie Brown?  What about a political prisoner?  What about the tradition in ancient societies that the elders are all wise?

3.  Against Aristotle, Foot believes that wisdom does not depend on social status, political power, or intellectual power.

4.  Connected with Foot's more egalitarian view of wisdom is also a rejection of pride as a virtue.  (Aristotle, of course, thought pride was one of the highest virtues, resting, as Richard Taylor claims, right under wisdom in value.)  Foot tends to follow the Christian tradition of virtue ethics on this point and others.

Note:  Foot does not want to imply that the cognitive elements of virtue are not as important.  (Balance is one of the geniuses of this view.)  Obviously, vice is never just a problem of weak will, but also, and always, ignorance as well.

ARISTOTLE'S THREE TYPES OF PERSONS

The sophron is the one who naturally and without effort lives in the mean.  She is not even tempted to do wrong.  Such a person is the embodiment of the Greek's great virtue sophrosyne, moderation, self-mastery, or more literally "having a sound mind." Such a person as "natural" virtue.

The enkrates (lit. "having the will") is one who does not naturally live in the mean and is always tempted.  But he always has the will to overcome temptation.  Such a person has "duress" virtue.

The akrates (lit. "no will") is one who does not naturally live in the mean and is always tempted.  But the akrates does not have the will to overcome temptation.

"NATURAL" VS. "DURESS" VIRTUE

Let us take the example of Jack and Jill, who work in a bank at the same position.  Each have the same opportunity to embezzle money from their tills.  Jill never thinks about doing it, and thus can be said to have "natural" virtue.  However, Jack is always tempted to take some money for  himself, but he always overcomes the temptation.  Let us call Jack's virtue "duress" virtue.

Which person has highest moral worth?  Kant's answer is clear: Jack, because we are sure that he is not stealing out of duty.  We are not sure about Jill, because of her natural inclination not to steal.  (As Kant reminds us: we don't praise people for preserving their lives when they have every inclination to do just that.)  Kant's view seems unsatisfactory, because we definitely want to give Jill moral worth.  Indeed, if after a probationary period, the bank managers have to decide whom to keep--Jack or Jill--it is obvious that they will not want to keep Jack on.  (Let's assume for the sake of argument that Jack confesses his daily temptations to his superiors.)

One might argue that "duress" virtue is not virtue at all.  One might argue that we praise Jack for his efforts in overcoming temptation, not for his virtue.  If the virtues are habits, as Aristotle says, then it is clear that honesty is not yet completely ingrained Jack as it seems to be in Jill.  If virtue is a "corrective" disposition, as Foot claims, then Jack is not fully inclined to be honest.  Recall that Aristotle said that the virtuous person not only wants to what is right, but also takes pleasure in it.

On the other hand, as one of my former students argued: "duress virtue is the father of natural virtue and must be praised as such.  A utilitarian may even point out the utility of praising duress virtue, for it is that which brings about natural virtue as it is exercised" (David Austin, 103 student, Fall, '89).  This is certainly true if you think of how children learn the virtues: their natural disposition is to think of themselves before others, and the virtues are taught as correctives to "nature."  So "natural" virtue does not turn out to be so natural afterall.  So the difference between Jack and Jill is that Jack has not matured in his moral development, whereas Jill's natural inclinations to be tempted have completely overcome.

As another test of our intuitions on this matter, review the trial and death of the two great heroes of Western culture, Jesus and Socrates.  What kind of virtue does each have in the face of death?  Even though it might be offensive to some, we need to think of Jesus as a human being for purposes of this exercise.  Thinking of him as God skews the possibly of any instructive comparison.

Think of another scenario.  A radical environmentalist lives on 40 acres outside of Moscow, next to a person who runs a manufacturing plant on the adjoining property.  The county passes stiff new pollution laws, with which the "green" happily complies.  (Let us say that it does not cost him anything to comply.)  The owner of the plant reluctantly complies with the new rules, although it means that he cannot give his employees a raise and predicts a big fall in profits.  Whose virtue isgreater?

RICHARD TAYLOR ON PRIDE (Ethics, Faith, and Reason, p. 105)

"Pride is a justified love of oneself; a justified perception that one is better than others.  Pride is highmindedness (megalopsychia; lit. "great soulness"); it is a high and correct opinion of one's own worth.  The only judge who can determine this is oneself, but one must have the qualities of excellence that are required.  One must adhere to one's own standards of excellence and not give in to fashion or peer pressure.  A proud person does not go by what people say is "right" or "wrong," but is guided by worth, honor, and the deterrent effect of shame.  The greatest vice is to shame or dishonor oneself."

But pride, according to Taylor, is not the highest virtue--wisdom is.  It is the knowledge of what the good ends of life are and the ways in which the virtues can be developed as established habits.  But contrary to Foot, Taylor would agree that wisdom is not available to all those who want it.

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