What is the difference between the internal labor force and the external labor market?

A labor market is a place where willing workers offer skills to employers and in return, they are given compensation in form of salaries or wages. The labor market can be either classified as an internal labor market or an external labor market. Both markets have distinct features as shown below;

Internal Labor Market External Labor Market

Company hires workers at entry level and higher levels are filled from within by way of transfer of experienced workers within departments or promotion. Company searches for qualified workers from outside the organization rather than hire from within to fill senior levels.

Labor wages are governed by a set of administrative rules. Wages are determined internally rather than be influence by market pressures. Wages are determined by forces of demand and supply and thus they are influenced by market pressures. Mostly workers prefer to work with the highest bidder.

It provides some form of incentive to employees to be committed ,continuously motivated to acquire new skills and productive so as to ensure they rise up the ladder Provides no form of incentive because employers find it hard to hire employees who already are in the organization.

What trend do you think in the domestic and international labor market presents the greater challenge to HR professionals?

The global value chain is the next trend where production process will be decentralized across different countries. This globalization will cause companies to restructure their operations through outsourcing and offshoring of activities. This is a challenge to the HR Professional because it will lead to layoffs of many low level workers. This will lead to cheap labor and increased unemployment rates (Piore, 1971).

How can stereotypes potentially influence decisions related to HR systems?

Stereotypes are bias that influence decisions thus leading to discrimination. Human resource systems should viewed as means of restoring the competitive position of companies however; stereotypes have proved to be a main factor that affects decision related to this system in various capacities (Piore, 1971).

In most Asian countries there is a persistent stereotype that females are not equal to men. This is also evident in Latin American countries where there exist negative stereotype about female being lesser to men and misguided perception on gender roles. These stereotypes have clouded most decisions made by HR such as; Women are not given equal privilege to battle out for competitive positions since they are deemed as less qualified (Piore, 1971).. They cannot be leader since in most of their culture its against the norm for women to lead. Women are deemed to be voiceless thus since they cant fight for their rights, its easier to oppress them than the male so decision mostly favor the men.

References

Piore, M., & Doeringer, P. (1971). Internal labor markets and manpower analysis: Lexington, Mass: Heat.

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Author

Listed:

  • Edward P. Lazear
  • Paul Oyer

Abstract

Internal labor markets are those where workers are hired into entry level jobs and higher levels are filled from within. Wages are determined internally and may be quite free of market pressure. External labor markets imply that workers move somewhat fluidly between firms and wages are determined by some aggregate process where firms do not have significant discretion over wage setting. There are a number of theories that lead to internal labor markets. Using data from Sweden from the late 1980s, it is found that although there is significant evidence of internal promotion being important, a significant external market exists that affects both wage setting and hiring patterns. Even in Sweden, which most would not choose as the best example of a free labor market, external factors seem to create strong discipline on the ability of firms to set wages.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2003. "Internal and External Labor Markets: A Personnel Economics Approach," NBER Working Papers 10192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10192
    Note: LS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    1. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. C. Sofia Machado & Miguel Portela, 2011. "Age and opportunities for promotion," NIPE Working Papers 03/2011, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.

      • Machado, C. Sofia & Portela, Miguel, 2013. "Age and Opportunities for Promotion," IZA Discussion Papers 7784, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    3. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
    4. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 20, pages 1769-1823, Elsevier.

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    6. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883.

      • Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2007. "Personnel Economics," NBER Working Papers 13480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    7. Bertheau, Antoine, 2021. "Employer Search Behavior: Reasons for Internal Hiring," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    8. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal Labor Markets," Introductory Chapters, in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.),The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.

      • Waldman, Michael, 2007. "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets," MPRA Paper 5113, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    9. Alan Benson & Ben A. Rissing, 2020. "Strength from Within: Internal Mobility and the Retention of High Performers," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(6), pages 1475-1496, November.
    10. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012. "Personnel Economics," Introductory Chapters, in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.),The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.

      • Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2007. "Personnel Economics," NBER Working Papers 13480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    11. Jäger, Simon & Heining, Jörg, 2019. "How Substitutable Are Workers? Evidence from Worker Deaths," MPRA Paper 109757, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Jan 2019.
    12. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.

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      • Dohmen, Thomas, 2003. "Performance, Seniority and Wages: Formal Salary Systems and Individual Earnings Profiles," IZA Discussion Papers 935, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    14. Kampkötter, Patrick & Sliwka, Dirk, 2014. "Wage premia for newly hired employees," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 45-60.
    15. Edward P. Lazear, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," NBER Working Papers 6957, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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      • Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 2003. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," Working papers 4324-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
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    19. Kwon, Illoong & Meyersson Milgrom, Eva M., 2014. "The significance of firm and occupation specific human capital for hiring and promotions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 162-173.
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    21. José Ángel Zúñiga Vicente & José David Vicente Lorente, 2003. "Assessing the Structural Change of Strategic Mobility Determinants Under Hypercompetitive Environments," Working Papers 0302, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Feb 2003.
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    What is external labor market?

    external labour market. noun [ C ] UK ( US external labor market) HR, WORKPLACE. the system by which a company looks outside its own organization to find a suitable person for a senior job, instead of giving the job to someone who is already working for the company at a lower level.

    What are the 2 types of labor markets?

    The two types of labor markets are internal and external. Internal markets includes jobs and employees within a company. External labor markets are all jobs and workers that are not within a single company.

    What is internal labor force quizlet?

    Internal Labor Force. Organization's workers include its employees and people who have contracts to work at the organization. Internal labor force is drawn from the external labor force. External Labor Market. Individuals actively seeking jobs.

    What is the difference between labor supply and labor market?

    The labor market is the collection of all buyers and sellers of labor services. The labor supply is the number of workers that are willing and able to work at the current wage rate. The labor market is determined by the intersection of the labor demand and labor supply.