By Anthony H. Cordesman Show
August 3, 2020 Over a period of a little more than a month, the U.S. has gone from a mixture of competition and cooperation with China to direct confrontation. This confrontation has also focused largely on the civil level – more specifically on ideology, economics, industrial espionage, cyberattacks on civil networks and databases, and disinformation campaigns. Top Administration officials have given five major speeches which assert that China can no longer be treated as a state evolving towards a more liberal power that will pursue security and economic objectives on terms the U.S. and other states can accept. These speeches assert that China has become an authoritarian state that is driven by a Communist ideology, is seeking to become the world’s dominant power, and is using methods of competition that are illegal and violate international norms. Secretary of State Pompeo made this clear in the last – and most definitive – of these five speeches by stating that,
The previous speeches each addressed key areas of Chinese competition that the speaker felt violated international norms and legitimate forms of competition, and in doing so, threatened the U.S. and its allies. Each made it clear that China had evolved into an increasing threat. This analysis provides the key excerpts from each speech. It traces the full set of arguments advanced by the top officials of the United States government. It highlights each of the specific examples which cite Chinese behavior that threaten the U.S. and other states – and also serves as a reference for what could be the most important shifts in U.S. policy towards China and its relations with the United States and the world since President Nixon’s opening to China in 1971-1972. At the same time, the analysis that follows shows these speeches raise five critical issues for U.S. politics, strategy, and action in dealing with China:
In each case, it is clear that these speeches raise critical challenges, but they do not provide workable answers to any of these questions. Five Key Speeches That Change U.S. Policy from Competition to ConfrontationSenior Administration officials – ranging from the Director of the FBI to the Secretary of State – have given four speeches and statements that have charged China with actively violating and undermining international values and competing on illegal terms – singling out Chairman Xi Jinping – who has served as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) since 2012, and President of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 2013.
The first three of these speeches were designed to be given in a series, building up to a final major policy address by the Secretary of State that called for open confrontation with China and the creation of a new international system to contain China’s action and ambitions. The equivalent of a fifth speech was added in the form of a statement that dealt with Chinese claims in the South China Sea, Taiwan, and Japan – made at a time when Chinese and U.S. military activity in the region had reached near record heights.
Examining the Key Quotes from Each Speech: Sometimes Words Really MatterThese speeches have all been reported in a summarized form in U.S. and global media, but their content and importance has been overshadowed by the Coronavirus, U.S. domestic politics, the closing of the Chinese consulate in Houston and the U.S. consulate in Wuhan, the crisis in Hong Kong, and a host of other global crisis and conflicts. They are cases, however, where words really matter, and where the charges made against China now need as much open source verification as possible. The actual contents of each speech are also important because they make a major shift in the way the U.S. assesses Chinese competition and the Chinese threat. These five speeches and statements, U.S. strategy documents, U.S defense budgets, and U.S. annual threat assessments all illustrate the fact that the United States, its allies, and its strategic partners not only face a wide range of military threats from China, but they also face a continuing set of civil threats as well. The U.S. has now taken the official position that its confrontation with China is a civil-military or “whole of government” challenge – where the civil challenge may pose even more of a threat than the military one. As documents like the Defense Intelligence Agency’s annual report on Chinese Military Power make all too clear, the U.S. does face serious military challenges from China and must deter and defend against the risk of major conventional and nuclear wars. The U.S. has now made it equally clear, however, that this is only part of the story. The U.S. must deal with ongoing, constant economic and technological challenges that either do not directly involve the use of military forces or limit it to demonstrative military actions; the use of third country state or non-state actors and limited clashes; as well as the almost invisible use of information, disinformation, and cyberwarfare as a different kind of weaponry. At the same time, the speeches became steadily more hardline and confrontational. They progressed from relatively normal reporting on potential threat behavior to a final Pompeo speech that attacked the leadership of China on the basis that the United States, it allies, and the world could not coexist with China’s current behavior. Tracking this escalating rhetoric is as important to understanding the shift in the U.S. position from a strategy of competition to confrontation as focusing on the indictments each speech made of China’s behavior. The Threat from Information Warfare and PropagandaThe first speech, by National Security Advisor O’Brien, set the stage by addressing China’s leadership, ideology, and conduct by stating that the U.S. had long failed to understand the true nature of China’s behavior. It was a tightly written speech which has to be read in full to understand its full impact, but some key quotes show the themes that were repeated in the speeches that followed:
At the same time, O’Brien gave specific examples Chinese activities – many of which characterize Russia’s behavior as well:
The Threat from Cyber, Economic Espionage, Hacking, and Manipulating Academia and Research ActivitiesFBI Director Wray’s speech was also very tightly written and carefully structured in content and tone. It limited its broad indictments of China, but key excerpts make it clear that it was part of the package of four speeches and referenced both the O’Brien speech, warning that,
Wray then went on to provide the following specific examples of the conduct he was addressing: Economic Espionage
Clandestine Efforts
Threats to Academia
Malign Foreign Influence
Threats to the Rule of Law
The Threat from a Global Economic ChallengeAttorney General Barr’s speech used harder line rhetoric, but drew on the O’Brien and Wray speeches and also mentioned the fourth Pompeo speech to come. Excepts show it was clearly focused on confrontation with both China’s leadership and its political system,
Barr also highlighted examples of actions by U.S. companies that he felt facilitated China’s success, citing leading U.S. firms by name,
The Pompeo Statement on the U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China SeaSecretary of State Pompeo’s statement on the South China Sea was never intended to be part of the four speeches redefining U.S. strategy towards China. It came at a time, however, when U.S. and Chinese forces were both active in gray area operations designed to assert Chinese authority, on the one hand, and show that the U.S. was committed to maintaining its strategic position, on the other. It also came at a time when China has effectively ended most of Hong Kong’s independence, challenged Japan’s position, and created new tensions with Taiwan. Accordingly, his statement became a de facto part of the U.S. effort to redefine its position relative to China, and its focus on international law and norms again made it clear that the civil dimension was as important as the military one:
Making Fundamental Changes in U.S. and Allied Relations with ChinaWhen Secretary of State Pompeo did give the fourth speech in the series, he used the strongest rhetoric of any of the speakers. He focused on China’s politics and goals, and he issued a broad indictment of its conduct. The initial impact of his speech was weakened because it was given on a Friday in California – at a time when media coverage is not at its peak and when there were so many ongoing crises including other issues relating to China – that it did not get the attention it deserved. It also is not an easy speech to excerpt. The Secretary delivered it at the Nixon Center in a highly colloquial way which matched his direct audience, but it was relatively informal by the standards normally associated with a major policy speech. There was nothing ambiguous, however, about the Secretary’s indictment of China’s government and leadership, both in his speech and in his answer to the questions that followed. He only gave relatively few examples of Chinese conduct, citing the previous speakers, but he unambiguously called for fundamental changes in the way the United States, its allies, and the rest of the world deal with China.
What Comes Next?Taken together, these speeches call for a major shift in America’s strategic position relative to the China. While no speaker ever referred to shift from “competition” to “ confrontation,” and Secretary Pompeo only broadly suggested seeking a major change in American structure of alliances and the international order, they collectively outline what could be the most decisive shift in U.S. strategy since Secretary Marshall announced a U.S. commitment to confronting the Soviet Union on a global basis in 1947. There are, however, five key issues that the United States – not simply the current Administration – will now have to address:
In each case, it is clear that these speeches raise critical challenges, but they do not provide workable answers to any of these questions. Is this View of China Correct, and Does it Offer the Best Option for Dealing with China in the Future?Each of the four core speeches, and the additional speech dealing with the South China Sea, raises valid issues about China’s conduct; approach to economic competition; and use of espionage, gray area methods, and military actions bordering on hybrid warfare. They make strong arguments that the United States needs to make major changes in its relations with China and matching changes in its relations with other states to gain their support. The speeches do not, however, take account of the world that China has faced in the centuries since the Opium Wars, or the many other historical reasons for its behavior. It treats China’s motives as being the product of a communist ideology, and it ignores the fact that high levels of state control of China’s politics and economy interact with a mix of state capitalism and private enterprise. It applies U.S. standards to international legitimacy and focuses on China’s real human rights abuses without noting the immense progress that has taken place in reducing poverty and improving civil living standards and opportunities. The Wray speech, for example, states that,
This is not a balanced statement of even a Marxist-Leninist ideology, and it ignores the fact that China’s authoritarian character does have real limits or that China’s immense Communist Party is more an instrument of state control than a meaningful ideology. It also ignores the fact that some current Chinese goals – like its claims to the South China Sea – originated under Chiang Kai-shek in response to a long history of outside attacks on China, instead of being solely a product if its “Communist” regime. Accordingly, valid as the charges made in these speeches are, their sections on ideology in the four core speeches are particularly weak and fail to describe the current structure of Chinese government, politics, and motives. Far too many of the comments about ideology apply more to the Former Soviet Union than modern China. Somewhat ironically, the DIA report on Chinese Military Power does a better job of describing the structure and character of the Chinese government that these speeches. If the U.S. is to deal with the issues raised in these speeches, it needs to do a far better job of assessing the structure and nature of the Chinese government and political system, its actions overseas and how other states perceive them, and how the U.S. can best compete. The U.S. also needs to very carefully assess the best way to change Chinese behavior, whether opportunities still do exist for cooperation in many areas, and how the U.S. must change its own behavior to win the support of other states. Is this View of China One that has Bipartisan Support and that Will Endure Beyond the Coming Election?Surveys do show deep popular distrust of China in the United States. This is very different, however, from support for the views Secretary Pompeo expressed in terms of U.S. policy goals and from agreeing on any practical course of action. Many who do agree with the charge made about China’s conduct will feel that these positions are too strong; discount the ability to negotiate too much; and risk going from competition to open political, economic, and military conflict. Any consensus that leads to coherent U.S. action in dealing with problems this diverse will have to be built over time on the basis of far more evidence regarding China’s behavior, analysis of how it makes decisions and acts, and assessments on the U.S. ability to change China’s behavior rather than the current sentiment that is presented in these speeches. The timing is also awkward because it is so close to an election, the broad political climate is so partisan, and there are so many other immediate crises and issues to address. Building serious bipartisan support for a new approach to China probably can only begin after the election if President Trump is reelected or after the new Administration is elected if Biden becomes President. It will require far more planning and research than these speeches indicate have taken place to date, and also far more debate over the course of action the U.S. should pursue. The Current U.S. National Strategy addresses both China and Russia as Major Competitors. What Should the U.S. position Towards Russia Now Be?All of these speeches target China without addressing Russia. However, the new U.S. national strategy adopted in 2017 made Russia an equal threat to China. The U.S. is still debating the extent to which Russia has targeted U.S. elections – and Russia has conducted other disinformation, gray area, and hybrid operations hostile to the United States, as well as begun a major nuclear and missile modernization program. The potential importance of this mission was made all too clear after Secretary Pompeo gave his final speech on China. Other statements by a senior Administration official warned that the coming U.S. election was being targeted with disinformation campaigns conducted by China, Russia, and Iran. The National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) Director, William Evanina, issued a press release on July 24, 2020, stating that “Election security remains a top priority for the Intelligence Community.” This release is available from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, (https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2135-statement-by-ncsc-director-william-evanina-100-days-until-election-2020). It was relatively short, but it addressed a critical aspect of both Russian and Chinese behavior,
Russia may fall far short of China as an emerging economic power, but it is still a massive nuclear power and poses a major threat to NATO. Its disinformation campaigns as well as its gray zone and hybrid operations pose an ongoing threat to the U.S. and many allies; and its activities in Libya, Syria, and the Ukraine show this threat is both operational and serious. The U.S. cannot focus on China at the expense of Russia or other commitments without carefully assessing the consequences and making major revisions to its overall strategy. The timing will also be awkward because the U.S. must simultaneously deal with the economic impact of the Coronavirus and formulating the FY2021 budget request. What Changes are Required in U.S. Strategy and to What Extent Can the U.S. Create Global Support for Its position?Identifying major challenges is very different from offering credible ways to deal with them. The speeches summarized in this analysis indict China’s leadership, government, economy and civil sector, and military claims without suggesting any clear strategy for countering the problems they highlight or negotiating some settlement or new relationship with China. They are yet another demonstration of the fact that the U.S. government seems incapable on understanding that a real-world strategy requires a practical course of action, an actual plan to implement it, and the resources required to execute it. China (and Russia) are not simply a “whole of government” problem, they need a “whole of government solution.” It is not clear that the speeches just described clearly recognize the extent to which this really requires planning, resources, and implementation. How Does the U.S. Build Support for a New Approach to Dealing with China’s Position, and Show That Its Stance Is Valid?One key problem the U.S. faces is illustrated by the examples of Chinese conduct in the various speeches. Many have never been given the same level of official attention or visibility before. The U.S, has provided detailed official assessments of Chinese military power, but it has never attempted to establish an adequate open source set of reports and evidence to make the full case for the arguments advanced in each speech. These is no ongoing set of official reports that provide detailed chronologies and evidence to the points about China’s methods of economic competition, information warfare, and other largely civil activities – particularly as they apply to Chinese (or Russian) actions in all countries that the U.S. needs to influence. This is a broader problem within the U.S. government. The U.S. does not attempt to counter malign forms of information warfare by fully and consistently communicating the facts in the many areas where only the government can gather the necessary data. For example, it now no longer provides an annual assessment of statistical patterns in terrorism – the last issue of its only report on Russian military power was in 2017 – it fails to properly update the CIA World Factbook, it fails to require its major combatant commands to issue meaningful strategy documents and assessments, it provides almost no real strategy justification for its budget requests, and it has effectively given up its effort to produce a workable assessment of the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT). There are exceptions like Chinese Military Power, but the U.S. does an appallingly bad job of using declassified information to counter the information warfare and disinformation activities of countries like China and Russia. It has steadily cut back on such reporting over the years, relied heavily on topical short-term public affairs efforts, and now needs to develop a whole new stream of reporting. Many of the areas involved in assessing China’s methods of competing and actions are ones where there is little open source reporting that is not ideological or highly politicized, and where gross over-classification is the rule rather than the exception. A narrow focus on the cost of reports adds to the problem because they are perhaps the cheapest weapon available. Competing in these areas means credible transparency – an art form where the U.S. is sadly lacking. Transitioning from Competition to Civil-Military Confrontation with China without Having a Clear Strategy or Addressing RussiaThere are two other aspects of these speeches that should be a subject of deep concern if the U.S. is to act on its words, and gain international support: First, they indict China’s leadership, government, economy and civil sector, and military claims without suggesting any clear strategy for either countering the problems they highlight or negotiating some settlement or new relationship with China. Second, the U.S. must acknowledge that its approach to China is not isolated to its bilateral relationship, but it is also facing the same problems with Russia and even Iran. Instead, the following considerations are needed when creating a strategy:
In regards to Russia, if one considers Evanina’s statement in the context of the fact there still is no final report on the accuracy of the FBI’s investigation in Russia’s role in the 2016 election, reports on Russian nuclear and space warfare developments, or reports on Russia’s role in British and other foreign disinformation campaigns, it is clear that the failure to address Russia is a critical omission. This is particularly true given the fact that the new National Security Strategy that the U.S. adopted in 2017, the new National Defense Strategy that the U.S. adopted in 2018, and both the defense budget submissions and the annual threat assessments by the Director of National Intelligence from 2012 to the present have all focused on Russia as well as China. This is also imperative as Russia is still sustaining the fighting in the Ukraine; putting steady pressure on NATO, particularly in Russia’s border areas; testing anti-satellite systems in space; executing a major nuclear and missile program; developing long-range hypersonic pression strike systems; carrying out gray area and hybrid operations in Syria and Libya; and playing a major role in trying to shape world petroleum prices. For additional Burke Chair studies see:
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has served as a director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as consultant on Afghanistan to the United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of State. What are the major differences in the business governance structure of the Chinese and American economy?Chinese corporations use two-tier structure that consists of board of directors and supervisory committee, but U.S. corporations use one-tier structure which is composed of only board of directors.
What is China's way of government?The Government of the People's Republic of China (simplified Chinese: 中华人民共和国政府; traditional Chinese: 中華人民共和國政府; pinyin: Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Zhèngfǔ) is an authoritarian political system in the People's Republic of China under the exclusive political leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
What is the economic relationship between the United States and China?Trade surged: the value of U.S. goods imports from China rose from about $100 billion in 2001 to $500 billion in 2021. This leap in imports is due in part to China's critical position in global supply chains; Chinese factories assemble products for export to the United States using components from all over the world.
Is the US or China better off economically?The United States is several times wealthier than China; and since the global financial crisis over a decade ago, the absolute gap between the two nations has been growing by trillions of dollars each year.
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