Is the view that criminal sanctions should be so powerful that offenders will never repeat their criminal acts?

journal article

HOW MUCH DO WE REALLY KNOW ABOUT CRIMINAL DETERRENCE?

The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-)

Vol. 100, No. 3, Centennial Symposium: A Century of Criminal Justice (Summer 2010)

, pp. 765-824 (60 pages)

Published By: Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law

https://www.jstor.org/stable/25766109

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Abstract

This Article discusses the deterrence of crime through sanctions. It begins with a brief intellectual history of deterrence theory in the work of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, two Enlightenment philosophers who created the conceptual foundation for later deterrence and rational choice theory. Although a prominent intellectual current by the end of the 1700s, interest in deterrence and rational choice based theories of criminal offending was later eclipsed by more biologically and psychologically based explanations. Interest in deterrence theory and the deterrent effect of legal sanctions was not rekindled until the mid-1960s. This Article discusses the particular and important role of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology in publishing the works of both those who were highly critical of deterrence theory and those who wished to keep it alive, though vividly aware of the lack of any empirical support for it. This Article discusses the theoretical connections that are presumed by the deterrence process and briefly reviews some important empirical studies pertaining to each of those presumed causal connections. The empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that there is a marginal deterrent effect for legal sanctions, but this conclusion must be swallowed with a hefty dose of caution and skepticism; it is very difficult to state with any precision how strong a deterrent effect the criminal justice system provides. At the very least, there is a great asymmetry between what is expected of the legal system through deterrence and what the system delivers. There is greater confidence that non-legal factors are more effective in securing compliance than legal threats. It is argued that the empirical evidence does support the belief that criminal offenders are rational actors, in that they are responsive to the incentives and disincentives associated with their actions, but that the criminal justice system, because of its delayed imposition of punishment, is not well constructed to exploit this rationality.

Journal Information

The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology was founded in 1910 by Dean John Henry Wigmore, and has played a unique role in the criminal justice debate ever since. The journal provides a forum for dialogue and debate on current criminal law and criminology issues. The journal is one of the most widely read and cited legal publications in the world and is the third most widely subscribed journal published by any law school in the country. Its readership includes judges and legal academics, as well as practitioners, criminologists, and police officers. It publishes research in criminal law and criminology that addresses concerns pertinent to most of American society. The journal strives to publish the very best scholarship in this area, inspiring the intellectual debate and discussion essential to the development of social reform.

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Founded in 1859, the school that would become known as the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law was the first law school established in the city of Chicago. Today, Northwestern Law advances the understanding of law and produces graduates prepared to excel in a rapidly changing world. Northwestern Law uniquely blends a rigorous intellectual environment with a collegial and supportive community. Our students have access to the most interdisciplinary research faculty in the nation. We also have one of the lowest student-faculty ratios, so our students enjoy an unusual amount of individual access to these scholars, even after graduation. Our lakefront location in the heart of downtown Chicago provides a spectacular setting in which to live and study. A major world financial center, Chicago is the third largest city in the United States and one of its largest legal markets. Northwestern Law’s proximity to courts, commerce, and public interest activities enables students to experience the practice of law, as well as its theory, in one of the most vibrant legal and business communities in the world.

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journal article

Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century

Crime and Justice

Vol. 42, No. 1, Crime and Justice in America 1975–2025 (August 2013)

, pp. 199-263 (65 pages)

Published By: The University of Chicago Press

https://doi.org/10.1086/670398

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/670398

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Abstract

AbstractThe evidence in support of the deterrent effect of the certainty of punishment is far more consistent than that for the severity of punishment. However, the evidence in support of certainty’s effect pertains almost exclusively to apprehension probability. Consequently, the more precise statement is that certainty of apprehension, not the severity of the ensuing legal consequence, is the more effective deterrent. This conclusion has important policy implications among which are that lengthy prison sentences and mandatory minimum sentencing cannot be justified on deterrence. There are four major research gaps. The first concerns the mechanism by which police affect perceptions of the probability of apprehension. The second concerns the inextricable link between the deterrent effect of the threat of punishment and the potentially criminogenic effect of the experience of punishment. The third concerns the concept of a sanction regime defined by the sanctions legally available and how that legal authority is administered. Theories of deterrence conceive of sanctions in the singular, not the plural, and do not provide a conceptual basis for considering the differential deterrent effects of different components of the sanction regime. The fourth involves sanction risk perceptions. Establishing the link between risk perceptions and sanction regimes is imperative; unless perceptions adjust, however crudely, to changes in the sanction regime, desired deterrent effects will not be achieved.

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Current issues are now on the Chicago Journals website. Read the latest issue.Since 1979, the Crime and Justice series has presented a review of the latest international research, providing expertise to enhance the work of sociologists, psychologists, criminal lawyers, justice scholars, and political scientists. The series explores a full range of issues concerning crime, its causes, and its cures. In both the review and the thematic volumes, Crime and Justice offers an interdisciplinary approach to address core issue in criminology.

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Since its origins in 1890 as one of the three main divisions of the University of Chicago, The University of Chicago Press has embraced as its mission the obligation to disseminate scholarship of the highest standard and to publish serious works that promote education, foster public understanding, and enrich cultural life. Today, the Journals Division publishes more than 70 journals and hardcover serials, in a wide range of academic disciplines, including the social sciences, the humanities, education, the biological and medical sciences, and the physical sciences.

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© 2013 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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Which theory supports the view that all human behavior is learned through a process of social reinforcement?

Social learning theory posits that people emulate the behavior they observe in their environment, especially if that behavior is reinforced in others.

Which view of crime sees society as a collection?

A third perspective of how we define crime or create laws is referred to as conflict view, commonly associated with Karl Marx in the 1800s. Conflict view sees society as a collection of diverse groups that can include owners, workers, wealthy, poor, students, professionals, younger older, and more.

Which of the following components of deterrence theory is the most powerful in decision making?

First, by making certain, or at least making the public think that their offenses are not going to go unpunished, then there will be a deterrent factor. As Beccaria relates, this is the most important of these three elements within deterrence theory.

What deterrence occurs when a relatively more severe penalty will produce some reduction in crime?

Absolute Deterrence: A particular punishment can deter a type of crime completely. Marginal Deterrence: A relatively more severe penalty will produce some reduction in crime.