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journal article Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate SpecializationBrookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics Vol. 1990 (1990) , pp. 1-84 (84 pages) Published By: Brookings Institution Press https://doi.org/10.2307/2534780 https://www.jstor.org/stable/2534780 Read and download Log in through your school or library Alternate access options For independent researchers Read Online Read 100 articles/month free Subscribe to JPASS Unlimited reading + 10 downloads Purchase article $19.00 - Download now and later Journal Information For almost thirty years, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA) has provided academic and business economists, government officials, and members of the financial and business communities with timely research of current economic issues. Publisher Information The Brookings Institution is an independent, nonpartisan organization devoted to research, analysis, education, and publication focused on public policy issues in the areas of economics, foreign policy, and government. The goal of the Institution's activities is to improve the performance of American institutions and the quality of public policy by using social science to analyze emerging issues and to offer practical approaches to those issues in language aimed at the general public. In its conferences, publications, and other activities, Brookings serves as a bridge between scholarship and policymaking, bringing new knowledge to the attention of decision makers and affording scholars greater insight into public policy issues. The Institution's activities are carried out through three research programs (Economic Studies, Foreign Policy Studies, and Governmental Studies), as well as through the Center for Public Policy Education and the Brookings Institution Press. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. Abstract This paper provides evidence on the effects of successful tender offers on the number of target and acquiring firm employees. No significant change in combined employment is observed, on average, over the three-year period following offer completion. However, hostile tender offers completed between 1980 and 1984 are followed by an average 17.2% decline in employment. Net divestitures of operations over the period are responsible for some of the observed employment decrease; however, an estimated -12.2% change remains, on average, after adjusting for divestiture activity. Information contained in firm annual reports and in the Wall Street Journal indicates that the tender offers in the sample are often followed by considerable restructuring activity with respect to both target and acquiring firm operations. The findings suggest that acquiring firm managements may acquire new operations when the need to restructure their existing operations frees up resources, e.g. cash and/or managerial time and talent. The evidence also suggests that the corporate control market must be viewed as an integral part of the process by which US firms restructure to meet changing circumstances. Journal Information Managerial and Decision Economics is an international journal of research and progress in management economics. The journal publishes articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision making. Compared to other journals in economics, the focus of this journal is more normative than positive and the viewpoint is focused on managerial efficiency rather than on social welfare. Managerial and Decision Economics has articles from all of the functional areas of economics, as long as these articles are useful for managerial decision making, and from all the functional areas of business, so long as the articles use economic reasoning. Managerial and Decision Economics is currently published 8 times a year. Publisher Information Wiley is a global provider of content and content-enabled workflow solutions in areas of scientific, technical, medical, and scholarly research; professional development; and education. Our core businesses produce scientific, technical, medical, and scholarly journals, reference works, books, database services, and advertising; professional books, subscription products, certification and training services and online applications; and education content and services including integrated online teaching and learning resources for undergraduate and graduate students and lifelong learners. Founded in 1807, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. has been a valued source of information and understanding for more than 200 years, helping people around the world meet their needs and fulfill their aspirations. Wiley has published the works of more than 450 Nobel laureates in all categories: Literature, Economics, Physiology or Medicine, Physics, Chemistry, and Peace. Wiley has partnerships with many of the world’s leading societies and publishes over 1,500 peer-reviewed journals and 1,500+ new books annually in print and online, as well as databases, major reference works and laboratory protocols in STMS subjects. With a growing open access offering, Wiley is committed to the widest possible dissemination of and access to the content we publish and supports all sustainable models of access. Our online platform, Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) is one of the world’s most extensive multidisciplinary collections of online resources, covering life, health, social and physical sciences, and humanities. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection.
What are hostile and friendly takeovers?If a company's shareholders and management are all in agreement on a deal, a friendly takeover will take place. If the acquired company's management is not on board, the acquiring company may initiate a hostile takeover by appealing directly to shareholders.
What makes a takeover hostile?A hostile takeover is when a company or activist shareholder tries to gain control of a target company by sidestepping the company's management and board of directors, and going directly to its shareholders.
What is an example of a hostile takeover?Some notable hostile takeovers include when Kraft Foods took over Cadbury, when InBev took over Budweiser maker Anheuser-Busch, and when Sanofi-Aventis took over Genzyme Corporation.
What are the two types of hostile takeovers?A hostile takeover usually takes on one or both of two forms: (i) a tender offer; (ii) a proxy battle. In a tender offer the bidder directly approaches the target company's shareholders, usually with a public offer. The offer is to pay an above market share price to shareholders who agree to “tender” their shares.
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Buyers often prefer “friendly” takeovers to hostile ones because of all of the following except for:
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