Which of the following are ways that oversight of the bureaucracy can occur?

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Abstract

Congress can exert control over regulatory agencies either through oversight or through statutory control provisions that establish agency structure and process. Each strategy has advantages and disadvantages, and each is employed in varying degress in different policy areas. Although decisions about oversight and statutory control are separate, they are not independent. Plans to engage in ex post oversight make the benefits of statutory control less compelling and vice versa. In this sense, statutory control and oversight can be viewed as "substitutes" in the "production" of a controlled bureaucracy. From a legislator's point of view, the benefits of the two strategies depend on the policy area, the political environment, and the legislator's position within Congress. These exogenous factors determine a legislator's ideal level of each control strategy. Considering the two types of control in a single model leads to the finding that legislators who are members of the committee with jurisdiction over the agency prefer a lower level of statutory control than nonmembers. The difference occurs because the costs of oversight are lower for committee members. This prediction is tested using data from two bills that delegated policy decisions to the EPA.

Journal Information

The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization is an interdisciplinary exercise. It seeks to promote an understanding of many complex phenomena by examining such matters from a combined law, economics, and organization perspective (or a two-way combination thereof). In this connection, we use the term organization broadly - to include scholarship drawing on political science, psychology and sociology, among other fields. It also holds the study of institutions - especially economic, legal, and political institutions - to be specifically important and greatly in need of careful analytic study.

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Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. OUP is the world's largest university press with the widest global presence. It currently publishes more than 6,000 new publications a year, has offices in around fifty countries, and employs more than 5,500 people worldwide. It has become familiar to millions through a diverse publishing program that includes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, school and college textbooks, business books, dictionaries and reference books, and academic journals.

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Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization © 1997 Oxford University Press
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Abstract

Does the president or Congress have more influence over policymaking by the bureaucracy? Despite a wealth of theoretical guidance, progress on this important question has proven elusive due to competing theoretical predictions and severe difficulties in measuring agency influence and oversight. We use a survey of federal executives to assess political influence, congressional oversight, and the policy preferences of agencies, committees, and the president on a comparable scale. Analyzing variation in political influence across and within agencies reveals that Congress is less influential relative to the White House when more committees are involved. While increasing the number of involved committees may maximize the electoral benefits for members, it may also undercut the ability of Congress as an institution to collectively respond to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy.

Journal Information

The American Journal of Political Science (AJPS), published four times each year, is one of the most widely-read political science journals in the United States. AJPS is a general journal of political science open to all members of the profession and to all areas of the discipline of political science. JSTOR provides a digital archive of the print version of American Journal of Political Science. The electronic version of American Journal of Political Science is available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=showIssues&code;=ajps. Authorized users may be able to access the full text articles at this site.

Publisher Information

The Midwest Political Science Association, founded in 1939, is a national organization of more than 2,800 political science professors, researchers, students, and public administrators from throughout the United States and over 50 foreign countries. The association is dedicated to the advancement of scholarly communication in all areas of political science. Each year the association sponsors a three-day conference of political scientists in Chicago for the purpose of presenting and discussing the latest research in political science. More than 2,000 individuals participate in this conference, which features 300 panels and programs on politics. The MPSA is headquartered at Indiana University. For further information, contact William D. Morgan, Executive Director, email: .

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American Journal of Political Science © 2014 Midwest Political Science Association
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What are 4 ways that Congress can control the bureaucracy?

Both Congress and the president exercise direct oversight over the bureaucracy by holding hearings, making appointments, and setting budget allowances. Citizens exercise their oversight powers through their use of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and by voting.

What is bureaucratic oversight?

Bureaucratic oversight mechanisms are to ensure that public officials conduct themselves ethically as well as effectively and efficiently. These control mechanisms may be internal or external. The former refer more to accounting evaluation and are usually conducted by an audit unit of the target agency.

Which of the following is responsible for oversight of the national bureaucracy?

Congress is particularly empowered to apply oversight of the federal bureaucracy because of its power to control funding and approve presidential appointments.

What is the best way for Congress to provide oversight over the bureaucracy?

Congress uses public hearings to monitor bureaucratic behavior. Under some circumstances, Congress can also control the bureaucracy by re-writing legislation and altering appropriations to provide greater direction to those who must implement its policies.