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journal article
The Failure of the Bank of United States, 1930: NoteJournal of Money, Credit and Banking
Vol. 24, No. 3 (Aug., 1992)
, pp. 384-399 (16 pages)
Published By: Ohio State University Press
//doi.org/10.2307/1992725
//www.jstor.org/stable/1992725
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Journal Information
Founded in 1969, the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (JMCB) is a leading professional journal read and referred to by scholars, researchers, and policymakers in the areas of money and banking, credit markets, regulation of financial institutions, international payments, portfolio management, and monetary and fiscal policy. The JMCB represents a wide spectrum of viewpoints and specializations in its fields through its advisory board, associate editors, and referees from academic, financial, and governmental institutions around the world.
Publisher Information
The Ohio State University Press was established in 1957 and currently publishes 50-60 new books a year. We specialize in literary and cultural studies, (including comics, narrative theory, Victorian studies, and medieval studies) American studies, rhetoric and communication, gender and sexuality studies, and race and ethnic studies (including Black studies and Latinx studies). We also acquire books in regional studies on our Trillium imprint, creative works, on our Mad Creek imprint, and linguistics. In addition to its books, the Press publishes a distinguished group of journals including Inks, the journal of the Comics Studies Society, American Periodicals, Victorians, North American Journal of Celtic Studies, and Narrative.
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Journal of Money, Credit and Banking © 1992 Ohio State University Press
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journal article
Why Do Banks Disappear? The Determinants of U.S. Bank Failures and AcquisitionsThe Review of Economics and Statistics
Vol. 82, No. 1 (Feb., 2000)
, pp. 127-138 (12 pages)
Published By: The MIT Press
//www.jstor.org/stable/2646678
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Abstract
This paper seeks to identify the characteristics that make individual U.S. banks more likely to fail or be acquired. We use bank-specific information to estimate competing-risks hazard models with time-varying covariates. We use alternative measures of productive efficiency to proxy management quality, and find that inefficiency increases the risk of failure while reducing the probability of a bank's being acquired. Finally, we show that the closer to insolvency a bank is (as reflected by a low equity-to-assets ratio) the more likely is its acquisition.
Journal Information
The Review of Economics and Statistics is an 84-year old general journal of applied (especially quantitative) economics. Edited at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, The Review has published some of the most important articles in empirical economics. From time to time, The Review also publishes collections of papers or symposia devoted to a single topic of methodological or empirical interest.
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Among the largest university presses in the world, The MIT Press publishes over 200 new books each year along with 30 journals in the arts and humanities, economics, international affairs, history, political science, science and technology along with other disciplines. We were among the first university presses to offer titles electronically and we continue to adopt technologies that allow us to better support the scholarly mission and disseminate our content widely. The Press's enthusiasm for innovation is reflected in our continuing exploration of this frontier. Since the late 1960s, we have experimented with generation after generation of electronic publishing tools. Through our commitment to new products—whether digital journals or entirely new forms of communication—we have continued to look for the most efficient and effective means to serve our readership. Our readers have come to expect excellence from our products, and they can count on us to maintain a commitment to producing rigorous and innovative information products in whatever forms the future of publishing may bring.
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The Review of
Economics and Statistics © 2000 The MIT Press
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